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Does the presence of immigrants in one’s neighbourhood affect voting for far right-wing par-
ties? We study the case of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPO¨) which, under the leadership
of Jo¨rg Haider, increased its vote share from less than 5 percent in the early 1980s to 27
percent by the end of the 1990s and continued to attract more than 20 percent of voters in
the 2013 national election. We find that the inflow of immigrants into a community has a
significant impact on the increase in the community’s voting share for the FPO¨, explaining
roughly a tenth of the regional variation in vote changes. Our results suggest that vot-
ers worry about adverse labor market effects of immigration, as well as about the quality
of their neighbourhood. In fact, we find evidence of a negative impact of immigration on
“compositional amenities.” In communities with larger immigration influx, Austrian children
commute longer distances to school, and fewer daycare resources are provided. We do not
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1 Introduction
Voters in many European countries — including Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Ger-
many, Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, and the U.K. — have expressed strong support
for far-right and right-wing populist political parties in recent elections. This is a notewor-
thy change compared to the 1970s until the mid-1980s, when hardly any far-right party
had gained more than five percent in a general election. Economic policy is shaped by
these parties. Moreover, some of these parties have extreme tendencies. History reminds
us that the rise of extreme parties within a democratic environment can put democracy
itself at risk (Almond and Verba, 1965; Dahl, 1989). Explaining the success of far-right
parties is, therefore, clearly an important issue.
While far-right parties are quite heterogeneous, they share a number of ideological
features (Mudde, 1996). In particular, they all have fierce anti-immigration programs,
which often become their main focus. Thus, immigration is a natural candidate for ex-
plaining the success of these parties. At the time of this writing, an unprecedented inflow
of immigrants into Europe is occurring. It is unlikely that this inflow is going to stop
on its own. Instead, limits on immigration are now widely discussed and partially imple-
mented. Casual observation suggests that far-right parties throughout Europe are at least
temporarily benefiting from voters’ worries regarding this inflow. This casual observation
on current events is supported by suggestive historical evidence, presented in Figure 1,
which suggests a positive relationship between the share of immigrants in a population
and the support for far-right parties. Taking country fixed effects into account, the cor-
relation between the immigrant share and the existing far-right vote share is 0.53. When
considering also countries where no far-right parties exist, the correlation is 0.30.
[ Insert Figure 1 here ]
This paper investigates whether immigration in voters’ neighbourhoods is a driving
force of the rise of far-right parties. Although the cross-country evidence suggests a
positive relationship, it may be that enhanced contact with immigrants improves mutual
understanding and fosters an appreciation of different viewpoints (Allport, 1954). This
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may lead to a negative relationship between immigration and support for the far right.
Understanding the political consequences of immigration is a central prerequisite for the
formulation of intelligent policy proposals.
We look at the case of the Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei O¨sterreichs,
FPO¨), which generated substantial international attention. Until the early 1980s, the
FPO¨ was a small party with a vote share (in elections to the national parliament) of
around 5 percent. When Jo¨rg Haider became the party leader in 1986, the nationalists
within the party, favoring an anti-immigration stance, prevailed over its business-friendly,
libertarian wing. A nationalistic and anti-immigration approach has characterized the
party’s platform ever since. From 1986 onwards, the FPO¨ steadily increased its vote
share and became the country’s second-largest party by the end of the 1990s. In the
national elections of 1999 the FPO¨ gained almost 27 percent of the votes. In 2000, the
FPO¨ joined with the conservative Austrian People’s Party (O¨VP) to form a coalition
government that was in power until 2006. In 2002, this coalition enacted a set of more
restrictive immigration laws (including, for example, requirements that immigrants study
German). While a heavy election defeat occurred for the FPO¨ due to internal conflicts
in 2002, and while Jo¨rg Haider died in a car accident in 2008, the FPO¨ again became a
powerful political force in the 2013 elections with more than 20 percent of the votes. In
the first round of the Presidential election in April 2016, the FPO¨ candidate received the
relative majority, 35.1 percent of the votes; in the runoff in May, he received 49.7 percent.
However, the constitutional court annulled the result of that election due to irregularities
in the vote count in several communities. A new runoff election is scheduled for October
2016.
To test whether Austrian voters are more or less likely to vote for the FPO¨ when
there are more immigrants in their neighbourhood, we use community-level data. Com-
munity characteristics are taken from population census data, covering the universe of the
Austrian population, thus minimizing measurement problems.
While it is reasonable to think that more immigrants in one’s neighbourhood drive
anti-immigration sentiments and support for a far-right party, the causality may, in prin-
2
ciple, go the other way as immigrants may avoid xenophobic neighbourhoods. We begin
by establishing that there is no significant relationship between voting outcomes in a com-
munity at the beginning of a decade and the ensuing decadal change in the immigrant
share. While this does not eliminate concerns regarding reverse causality, it makes it much
less likely that immigrant residential sorting is driven by local support for the FPO¨. Re-
latedly, we investigate whether initial immigrants’ location choices may have been driven
by local attitudes towards immigration. We calculate the correlation between the immi-
grant share in 1971 and a proxy for long-standing anti-immigrant sentiments, namely, the
vote shares for the Deutsche Nationalsozialistische Arbeiterpartei (DNSAP, the Austrian
counterpart of the German NSDAP) from a 1930 election, the only Austrian election in
which the Nazis participated. We do not find a significant relationship, consistent with the
idea that local attitudes towards immigration are not prime determinants of immigrants’
location choices.
We then use two approaches to investigate the impact of immigration (in the primary
analysis: the share of residents without Austrian citizenship) on the FPO¨’s vote share
in a community. We use panel regressions with community fixed effects to eliminate
unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity and thus focus on the impact of the change in
immigration on the change in voting outcomes. We also provide complementary evidence
using instrumental variables regressions in changes, using immigrants’ historical residential
patterns as a source of exogenous variation.
Our baseline fixed effects estimate suggests that immigration has an economically
important and statistically significant effect on right-wing voting. A one percentage-point
increase in the immigrant percentage in a community increases the FPO¨ vote share in the
community by about 0.16 percentage points. This implies that a one-standard-deviation
increase in the local share of immigrants is associated with a 0.11 standard-deviation
increase in the FPO¨ vote share. These results are obtained controlling for a range of
community factors, such as industry structure, labor market conditions and demographic
and socio-economic characteristics. Interestingly for the current policy debate, we do not
identify an immigration level where the effect on FPO¨ votes levels off, nor do we find
3
evidence of “tipping points.”
Investigating the channels behind the association of immigration and voting results,
we establish the following further results. We document that low- and medium-skilled
immigration causes Austrian voters to turn to the far right, while more high-skilled im-
migration either has an insignificant or a negative effect on FPO¨ votes. We also find that
the effects of immigration are stronger where unemployment among natives is high; where
labor market competition between natives and immigrants is strong; where natives are
highly educated; and where there are many immigrant children. Moreover, we provide
suggestive evidence that immigration may have negative consequences for the quality of
schooling and the availability of childcare. Taken together, the evidence is consistent with
the idea that natives worry both about detrimental labor market outcomes and about
negative externalities of immigration on compositional amenities, and that these worries
are important drivers of anti-immigrant sentiments and support for the FPO¨.
Finally, we repeat the analysis with an instrumental variables (IV) approach. This is
an important complement to the fixed-effects approach because there may be unobserved
factors that attract immigrants but also boost FPO¨ support. We rely on specific features
of the history of immigration into Austria and the resulting historical settlement patterns.
Historical immigrant settlement patterns have been used as the basis for IVs in various
labor economics settings (see, for instance, Altonji and Card, 1991; Card, 2001; Dustmann,
Fabbri and Preston, 2005; Saiz, 2007; Cortes, 2008). In Section 5, we argue that, in
the present setting this is a useful approach because, arguably, the allocation of early
immigrant cohorts was mainly driven by institutional idiosyncracies. Drawing on different
inflows of immigrants into Austria at different points in time, we compute changes in the
“supply-push” component of immigration into communities from one census year to the
next.
The advantage of the IV approach is that it identifies a causal effect of immigration on
FPO¨ votes by exploiting exogenous variation generated by historical immigrant networks.
One limitation of the IV approach is a weak first stage when the change in immigration is
measured as the percentage-point increase in the share of immigrants in the community
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population. However, the IV works very well when the change in immigration is measured
in percent changes of the immigrant share (and when, therefore, the dependent variable
is the percent change of the FPO¨ vote share). While the percent-change specification
may lead to different quantitative predictions away from the mean, we verify that this not
a major problem in the present application: For the OLS fixed effects setting, we show
that percentage-point and percent-change specifications yield very similar predictions for
a broad range of immigration levels and FPO¨ vote shares.
Overall, the results of the two empirical approaches, OLS fixed effects and IV, yield
similar inferences. In particular, depending on the specification, a one-standard-deviation
increase in the local share of immigrants is associated with a 0.08-0.14 standard-deviation
increase in the FPO¨ vote share. We also find quite similar results as in the fixed effects
OLS regressions in terms of the relevance of the labor market and compositional amenities
channels.
Three guideposts can be used to put this analysis into the context of the existing
literature. First, our analysis is related to a rich literature studying political preferences
and attitudes towards immigration.1 This literature is typically based on survey data,
and only little evidence exists which studies attitudes towards immigration as revealed
in elections outcomes. Hence our results are complementary to the attitudes-towards-
immigration literature by studying to which extent support for the far right is related to
the presence of immigrants.2
The first published study on potential causal political consequences of broad-based
immigration3 is Otto and Steinhardt (2014), who examine the case of Hamburg. They
also first provide evidence of a positive impact of immigration on right-wing voting by
1For studies on attitudes towards immigration see Card et al. (2012); Dustmann and Preston (2004,
2007); Facchini and Mayda (2009); Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007, 2010); Krishnakumar and Mu¨ller
(2012); O’Rourke and Sinnott (2006); Scheve and Slaughter (2001). For studies related to preferences for
political parties and/or policies, see Citrin et al. (1997); Dahlberg et al. (2012); Du¨lmer and Klein (2005);
Knigge (1998); Lubbers and Scheepers (2000).
2Several studies in the political science literature provide suggestive evidence; see, e.g., Arzheimer and
Carter (2006); Arzheimer (2009); Golder (2003); Jackman and Volper (1996); Knigge (1998) and Lubbers,
Gijsberts and Scheepers (2002).
3Other studies, for example, Gerdes and Wadensjo¨ (2008), rely on arguably random assignment of
refugees in Denmark. They find that both anti-immigration parties and a left-wing pro-immigration
party benefit from immigration.
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conducting fixed effects estimation, and they then rely on lagged immigration shares as an
instrument for the future level of foreigner shares. They conclude that labor market effects
are unlikely to explain their results and instead argue that voters were concerned about
welfare and compositional amenities. More recently, several contemporaneous papers
(presented here in alphabetic order) provide further evidence of the effects of immigration.
Barone et al. (2016) document a positive impact of immigration into Italian municipalities
on centre-right voting.4 They also provide evidence that both the labor market channel
and the compositional amenities channel may be at work driving Italian voters to centre
right. The most immediate difference in our studies is that our focus is on far-right
voting. Moreover, we have access to complete time-varying census data and a very large
set of control variables. Brunner and Kuhn (2014) look directly at votes on immigration
policies, rather than voting outcomes. While our measure of political consequences —
the overall vote share of the far right — is necessarily more noisy (which ex ante makes
it less likely to find effects), our study has the advantage that it sheds light on a source
of the overall political power of the far right. Studying the case of Denmark, Harmon
(2015) argues that the share of high rise buildings in a municipality in 1970 provides a
valid instrument for the increase in ethnic diversity from 1981 to 2001, which is in turn
associated with more votes for the extreme right. His analysis is richer than ours in terms
of the consideration of vote outcomes also for other parties. On the other hand, because we
utilize a much larger number of communities (roughly 2,000 communities compared to 275
Danish municipalities), we are able to document that it is indeed immigration into one’s
neighbourhood that matters, and we are able to explore cross-sectional heterogeneity,
thus shedding light on the channels of the connection between immigration and far-right
voting. Mayda et al. (2015) study immigration to the U.S., where, contrary to the case of
Austria and other European countries, naturalization is frequent, allowing for a separate
analysis of naturalized immigrants and non-citizen immigrants. They find that in general
Democrats benefit from immigration, but that this can tip into support for Republicans at
4They use a historical settlement pattern instrument and argue that initial settlement patterns in 1991
were unaffected by political considerations because the parties they consider for their dependent variable
started appearing only after 1991.
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high immigration levels. Steinmayr (2016) provides evidence that the presence of asylum
seekers (that is, the extensive margin, not the share of immigrants) reduced FPO¨ votes
in two recent state elections in Austria. Finally, there are some studies that highlight
some specific channels that also play a role in our analysis. For example, Malgouyres
(2014) identifies in French community-level data a relationship between low-wage country
imports competition on the local vote share for the Front National.
In sum, each study has its unique features. In addition to the substantial differences
in the approach of investigating effects on elections, an important distinction of our work
relative to all these papers is that we study real effects of immigration on compositional
amenities, provide differentiated evidence of internal migration patterns, and consider the
possibility that historical attitudes may be associated with immigrant sorting. Collec-
tively, these papers and ours make a strong case that immigration and political outcomes
are linked.
Second, our work is related to the literature that studies the political economy of im-
migration policies. Even in countries where so far no important far-right parties have
emerged, immigration policies have been strongly shaped by politico-economic considera-
tions.5 Immigration is an issue with a particularly thin line separating pragmatic economic
policy from dogmatic political economics. Anti-immigrant politics may have ideological
sources, but politicians may also supply xenophobia because they find it instrumental in
discrediting political opponents whose policies benefit immigrants (Glaeser, 2005).
Third, this paper adds to more general work showing that economic and social con-
siderations can help explain voting patterns for parties on the extremes of the political
spectrum. Much as economic concerns led many voters to turn to the Nazis (King et al.,
2008), so have overall economic conditions played a role in the rise of extreme parties in
many countries at the beginning of the 20th century (de Bromhead et al., 2013). It is also
related to the literature on vote and popularity functions (Nannestad and Paldam, 1995).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the political
background of Austria and the data used for our analysis. Section 3 investigates whether
5See, for example, Facchini et al. (2011); Facchini and Steinhardt (2011).
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election outcomes predict the consequent inflow of immigrants into a community and
whether immigrant location is determined by long-standing political preferences of a re-
gion. Section 4 presents the empirical results for the impact of immigration on voting and
the availability of compositional amenities obtained from panel fixed effects regressions.
Section 5 presents results from an instrumental variables approach. Section 6 concludes.
2 Background and Data
2.1 Immigration and the FPO¨
We begin with an examination of the aggregate time-series pattern of immigration and
FPO¨ vote shares; see Figure A.5 in Supplementary Appendix A. In 1961, only 1.4 per-
cent of the resident Austrian population were foreign citizens. Due to the guest-worker
programs and the ensuing influx of further immigrants, this share had almost tripled by
1981. In response to emerging problems in the labor market, the Austrian government
enacted the Aliens Employment Act (1975), which regulated immigration and reduced the
influx of foreign workers. This resulted in a period of return-migration and a temporarily
stagnating immigrant share. From 1981 to 2001, the share of immigrants more than dou-
bled again, from 3.9 to 8.7 percent, with much variation across communities. Turkey and
(former) Yugoslav are the two most important sending countries. In 2001, 63.2 percent
of the total foreign resident population came from former Yugoslavia (45.3 percent) and
Turkey (17.9 percent). The majority of immigrants from Turkey are Muslim. Immigrants
from (former) Yugoslavia comprise Muslims, Orthodox Christians and Catholics.
The immigration wave of the late 1980s coincided with the rise of the FPO¨.6 After
Jo¨rg Haider took over leadership of the FPO¨ in 1986, the party increasingly invoked the
“dangers” to the native population of immigration in terms of crime, unemployment, and
decay of neighbourhoods and schools. Until 1986, the FPO¨ had not played a significant
role in national elections (despite having been a junior partner in a government coalition).
6We emphasize that other events also took place in that time period. For example, the Austrian
political landscape in the 1990s was also characterized by a general dissatisfaction with the governing
parties. The Social Democratic Party of Austria and the Austrian People’s Party had been governing as
a grand coalition since 1987. We include time fixed effects in our analysis.
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In the national elections of 1986, however, the FPO¨ attracted 9.7 percent of the votes.
Thereafter, support for the FPO¨ grew at a steady rate, passing the 15 percent and 20
percent thresholds in 1990 and 1994, respectively, and reaching more than 25 in the late
1990s. The development was accentuated by an additional immigrant wave during the
Yugoslavian political crisis in 1990 and the war in 1992.
In 1993, the FPO¨ launched an “Anti-Foreigner Referendum,” and 416, 531 Austrian
voters (7.35% of the electorate) approved this referendum. The cross-district correlation
between the support for this referendum and the share of votes for the FPO¨ in the national
parliamentary elections in October 1994 is 0.83. More generally, in the election years that
we study, the FPO¨ is widely recognized as having the most restrictive immigration policy
platform, while the main competitors, the Social Democratic Party of Austria and the
Austrian People’s Party had a much softer stance. In short, it is clear that a vote for the
FPO¨ represents a vote against immigration.7 Internal problems in the FPO¨ arose soon
after they had become a governing party. As a result of these disputes a new splinter
party, the Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZO¨), was established in 2005. After the
internal problems were resolved, the FPO¨ re-gained strength and obtained a 20.5 percent
vote share again in 2013.8 In the first round of the Presidential election in April 2016, the
FPO¨ candidate received the relative majority, 35.1 percent of the votes. In the runoff, he
received 49.7 percent of the votes. No significant far left-wing party emerged in Austria
during this period.
We note that Austria does not automatically confer citizenship to individuals born
in Austria. Instead, an Austrian-born child must have at least one parent with Austrian
7This is not to say that the other parties were completely passive. Under political pressure of increased
anti-immigration sentiments, and partly as a reaction to the FPO¨s anti-immigration activities, the Aus-
trian government introduced various new tighter immigration rules during the 1990s. While Austria’s
entrance into the EU in 1995 opened the borders to immigration from former EU-15 member states, in
2002, the center-right coalition of the Austrian People’s Party and the FPO¨ enacted a set of more restric-
tive immigration laws. These laws included requirements that immigrants study German; restrictions
on the temporary workers’ ability to obtain permanent residence; and, at the same time, a relaxation
of procedures for Austrian firms that were hiring high-skilled immigrants of key importance in certain
industries. Further rules were put into place to shield Austria’s labor market from excessive immigration
from the poor, neighboring, new EU member states after the EU expansions of 2004 and 2007.
8For consistency, we use the FPO¨ vote share as the dependent variable throughout. However, very
similar results hold when including the BZO¨, which also is on the far-right. This is not surprising as,
despite some interim strength, the BZO¨ obtained only 3.5 percent of the vote and failed to secure a seat
in parliament in 2013.
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citizenship in order to be considered for naturalization. Naturalizations are unlikely to
be important for studying the relationship between immigration and voting in Austria.
We first note that they imply two countervailing effects. On the one hand, immigrants
who receive Austrian citizenship may still be regarded as immigrants by the “original”
Austrian population, so that the immigrant share in our data understates the perceived
immigrant share in a neighbourhood. On the other hand, naturalized immigrants are
unlikely to vote for the FPO¨. Second, during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, the annual rate
of naturalizations was between 0.1% and 0.3% of the native population in most years.
Therefore, disregarding naturalizations is unlikely to be important for our analysis.
Just like in other countries (see the studies cited in the introduction), survey evidence
for Austria yields interesting results. For example, analyzing data from the European
and World Values Survey, we find in Supplementary Appendix C that those who prefer
that scarce jobs be given to native citizens or who even want a complete halt to labor
immigration are more likely to be in favor of the FPO¨, as are those who do not care about
the living conditions of immigrants or are not willing to do something to improve these
conditions. However, surveys also present some problems, sometimes making it difficult
to interpret results. In particular, surveys are not anonymous, and survey respondents
are unlikely to answer completely truthfully.9
2.2 Main variables, data sources, and descriptive statistics
To establish a relationship between immigration and far-right voting, we use community-
level data. In Austria, a community is part of a political district, which is in turn part
of one of the nine federal states. The community is the lowest administrative level. In
2001, Austria encompassed 2, 359 communities in 99 political districts.10 Vienna is the
9For example, according to the European and World Values Survey, done shortly before the 1999
general election, the FPO¨ could expect to obtain about 20 percent of votes, whereas, in the election, the
FPO¨ scored about 27 percent.
10Notice that we study the effects of the local (=community) presence of immigrants. To the extent
that voters worry about, for example, labor market competition with immigrants in other communities
(which may arise if labor markets span multiple communities), or about broader regional issues, additional
effects of immigration on voting behaviour may occur. To allow for such effects we repeated the analysis
using the 99 political districts rather than communities as the unit of observation. The overall results in
terms of both magnitude and significance are very similar and available on request.
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largest community, with about 1.5 million inhabitants in 2001. For our empirical analysis
we divide Vienna into its 23 so-called municipal districts and treat these as separate
communities. The smallest community, with 60 inhabitants (in 2001), is Gramais in
the federal state of Tyrol. The average community (excluding Vienna) had about 2, 800
inhabitants. The number of communities and their territorial boundaries have changed
over our sample period. In order to have a balanced panel of communities (and due to
some limitations of the industry structure data), we use a modified version of the territorial
boundaries of the year 2001, which leaves us with 2, 106 communities (including the 23
municipal districts of Vienna).11
Data on the percentage of FPO¨ votes in elections to the national parliament are
available from official statistics issued by the Austrian Federal Ministry of the Interior.12
Figure ?? in the Supplementary Appendix A shows the geographic distribution of the share
of votes for the FPO¨ for six general elections. With the exception of a very strong base
of support for the FPO¨ in the state of Carinthia (located in the south of Austria where
former party leader Jo¨rg Haider was leading the local government) no other particular
geographical patterns (over time) are evident.
Our key database for computing the percentage of immigrants and all socio-economic
control variables on the community level is the universe of all individual-level observations
from the decennial Austrian censuses (on-site at Statistics Austria). The completeness
of the census data affords the great advantage that we can minimize problems of mea-
surement error, an important concern in the literature that studies labor-market effects
(Dustmann et al., 2005, p. F329). Census data are available to us in electronic form for
1971, 1981, 1991, 2001, and 2011, but not for earlier years. The Austrian survey-census
was abolished after 2001 and replace by a registry-based census, also maintained by Statis-
tics Austria. For simplicity, we refer to all data as “census” data. The 2011 data have
some limitations. For example, they do not contain information on religion. Also, they do
11Further merges between communities occurred after 2001. In 2011, there were 1, 975 communities.
The original version of the paper did not use 2011 community-level data. Because redefining all community
boundaries also for prior years would be extremely time-consuming, we retained the structure of 2, 106
communities for prior years and merged the data obtained later into this existing structure.
12We focus on federal elections as in Austria the most important aspects of economic policy, including
immigration policy, are set at the federal level.
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not contain information on degrees earned abroad (which introduces measurement error
in our skill proxies in that year). However, on balance, the advantages of being able to
use another decade of data (which, at least, for the primary analysis is of the same quality
as the data for the other years) seem to outweigh the disadvantages.
We do not have census data for each possible election year, so we need to infer the
relevant immigrant share (as well as the socio-economic control variables) in those election
years that we wish to analyze. To minimize measurement error, the main analysis focuses
on elections that took place at most three years from the time of the nearest census, that is,
we consider t = {1979, 1983, 1990, 1994, 1999, 2002, 2013}.13 We relate the election results
of 1979 and 1983 to the 1981 census data. Similarly, the election results of 1990 and 1994
are related to the 1991 census data, the election results of 1999 and 2002 to the 2001 census
data, and the election results of 2013 to the 2011 census data. A potential concern is that
using election data before a census year exacerbates potential endogeneity problems. As
we will document, there is no evidence that election outcomes drive immigrant sorting,
but we nonetheless also conduct our analysis using strictly only election years 1983, 1994,
2002, and 2013. We pool the data to construct a panel and include year fixed effects in
all regressions (though we also conduct year-by-year investigations in the IV analysis).
In our baseline model, immigrants are residents without Austrian citizenship. We also
investigate the extent to which FPO¨ voting is driven by particular kinds of immigrants.
First, we calculate immigrant shares within education groups based on residents 15 years
of age or older. There are four education levels: (i) compulsory schooling, (ii) completed
apprenticeship training or lower secondary school; (iii) higher secondary school, and (iv)
academic degree. We sort immigrants into two groups, based on their highest attained
education level: (i) low and medium education (levels (i) and (ii)); and (ii) high education
(levels (iii) and (iv)). Second, we distinguish immigrants by their ethnic origin, estimating
separate effects for Muslim, Turkish, and Yugoslav immigrants.
As our standard set of community covariates we use the following variables calculated
from census data: the community’s number of inhabitants, the number of inhabitants
13The elections of 1986, 1995, 2006, and 2008 are not included in the main analysis as they are relatively
far from the census dates.
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squared, the natives’ age-sex-distribution (22 groups), the natives’ distribution of marital
status (i. e., the shares of natives who are single, married, divorced, and widowed), and the
natives’ distribution of labor market status (i. e., the shares of natives who are employed,
unemployed, retirees, children below 15, student, and others). We define these character-
istics with respect to the voting population, since this is the natural definition, given that
only Austrians citizens have the right to vote. In addition to the census-based covariates
just listed, the standard set of community covariates also includes industry structure,
which is calculated share as employment share in 32 sectors from the Austrian Social
Security Database. In specifications without community fixed effects, we included further
the following time-constant covariates: federal state fixed effects, the unemployment rate
in 1961, and the industry structure in 1973.14
Finally, we obtain data on various dimensions related to neighbourhood quality and
compositional amenities (see Section 4.3).
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics on the main voting and census variables used
in the empirical analysis below. As the columns for the individual election years show,
substantial cross-sectional variation exists across communities in Austria, both in election
outcomes and immigration levels. Unreported results show that communities without any
immigrants in 1971 (mostly rural areas) had essentially the same average unemployment
rate, in both 1961 and 1971, as those that did have immigrants in 1971.
[ Insert Table 1 here ]
14The unemployment rates for 1961, which are available on a political district level as reported by the
regional offices of the Public Employment Service Austria. A potential source for unemployment rates
on the community level would have been the 1961 Austrian census. However, as confirmed by Statistics
Austria, the only published source which lists variables on the community level reports only the sum
of the absolute number of employed and unemployed individuals. We do not have data on the industry
structure in the 1960s. Therefore, a potential limitation of our control variable is that it does not eliminate
any impacts of elements of the industry structure that were simultaneously non-persistent and correlated
with both immigrant allocations in the 1960s and voting decisions in recent years. However, given that we
find in the data that the industry structure is very persistent over time, we believe that this is ultimately
a minor concern.
13
3 Immigrant sorting, past election outcomes, and community
preferences
Before we start to study the effect of immigration on FPO¨ vote, it is useful to address the
reverse chain of causality. Do immigrants choose locations based on prior election out-
comes and/or based on long-standing preferences of certain communities? If immigrants
avoid communities with strong anti-immigrant sentiments, the influx of immigrants into
communities should be negatively related to FPO¨ vote shares in past elections. To the
extent such considerations drive immigrants’ location choices, there will be a downward
bias in an estimate of the effect of immigration inflows on the rise of FPO¨ votes.
To investigate this possibility, we test whether voting outcomes in a community at the
beginning of a ten-year (or twenty-year) period predict the ensuing decadal or two-decade
change in the immigrant share in that community.15 Figure 2 shows the corresponding
binned scatter plots. There is no indication that such relationship exists, neither in ten-
year nor in twenty-year horizon data.
[ Insert Table 2 here ]
Table 2 presents regression results which control for the standard set of community
covariates. These regressions in Panel A (for immigrants generally) confirm the findings
suggested by the figures. Panels B and C consider the same issue in the context of
immigrants differentiated by skill. Only two estimates are statistically significant, but they
are positive, suggesting that, to some extent, high-skilled immigrants enter communities
with a high prior FPO¨ share. However, the effects are economically very small, implying
that a one percentage point increase in the share of the FPO¨ leads a one hundredth
of a standard deviation increase in high-skilled immigration. All other estimates are
insignificant. Thus, again, there is no consistent evidence of sorting based on prior election
outcomes.
Our second approach to investigate the role of community preferences for immigrant
15In this analysis, to be conservative we use election years before a census year. Qualitatively the same
results obtain, however, if we use only election years after a census year, as we do in the regressions where
election outcomes are the dependent variable.
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sorting considers possible long-standing racial prejudices. Several recent papers have
argued that there is strong inertia in local beliefs and values (Voigtla¨nder and Voth,
2012; Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2013). To test for the relevance of this idea in the present
context, we use voting results from a 1930 election, the only Austrian election in which
the Deutsche Nationalsozialistische Arbeiterpartei (DNSAP, the Austrian counterpart of
the German NSDAP) participated. In Table 3, we regress the share of immigrants in
the year 1971 on vote shares in the year 1930 for the DNSAP. The unit of observation
here is a political district (because communities have changed so much across the forty
years that a close matching is impossible). While we find a positive correlation between
DNSAP voting and FPO¨ voting (in line with persistent political preferences), we do not
find any significant association between DNSAP votes in 1930 and the recent immigration
influx. This ameliorates the concern that historical attitudes may drive contemporaneous
settlement patterns.16
[ Insert Table 3 here ]
In sum, we do not find evidence pointing to a significant relationship between pre-
existing political preferences (as measured by past election outcomes) and the ensuing
change in the immigrant share at the community level. While this does not eliminate
concerns regarding reverse causality, it makes it much less likely that residential sorting of
recent immigrant cohorts contaminates our analysis of the role of rising immigrant shares
for subsequent electoral support for the FPO¨.
4 Fixed effects estimates
In this section we present panel fixed effects estimates of the relation between immigration,
voting outcomes, and compositional amenities effects of immigration. In Section 5 we
provide evidence based on IV estimation methods.
16We note that if it were indeed the case that fewer immigrants selected into communities with stronger
historical cultural prejudices, this would bias against finding an effect of immigration on FPO¨ voting in
the later empirical investigation.
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4.1 Immigration and far-right voting
The dependent variable is FPO¨it, the percentage FPO¨ votes in community i in election
year t. The explanatory variable of primary interest is IMMit, the percentage immigrants
(over total resident population) in community i at time t.17 In all specifications, we include
community fixed effects to control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity.
The evidence presented in Table 4 strongly suggests a positive (within-community)
relationship between immigration and the support for the far right.18 These results are
based on all national elections in the sample that are at most three years from a cen-
sus. Some of these elections are before a census and hence the measured covariates may
not perfectly capture community characteristics at the election date. To minimize such
measurement issues, in analysis on request, we confine the sample to elections after the
previous census. It turns out that our results remains unaffected, as point estimates re-
main essentially unchanged. This is also consistent with the results obtained in Section 3
that immigrant sorting does not appear to be driven by election outcomes. We verify in
Section 5.3 that when running the OLS regressions with fixed effects as a log-log specifi-
cation (which corresponds to regressing percent changes in FPO¨ vote shares on percent
changes in immigrant shares), we obtain quantitatively similar results.
[ Insert Table 4 here ]
We also checked whether the estimates of the impact of immigration on FPO¨ voting
are sensitive to the inclusion of additional (or omission of some) controls. For example, Ta-
ble B.2 in the Supplementary Appendix B shows that the estimated effects of immigration
17In all regressions in this paper, we weight observations by community population size. Standard
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity of unknown form and are clustered on the community and census
year levels.
18The full regression is shown in Table B.1 in the Supplementary Appendix B. While unemployment
is univariately positively associated with FPO¨ votes, including socioeconomic controls makes this vari-
able insignificant and reverses the sign. The pure OLS estimate (without community fixed effects) for
immigration is around 0.1, thus smaller than the fixed effect estimate.
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on FPO¨ votes do not vary strongly when we add educational attainment proxies.19
An important question especially in the context of the current situation in Europe is
whether there are non-linearities (or even non-monotonicities) in the relationship between
immigration and far-right voting. On the one hand, it is conceivable that there exist
“tipping points” of immigration levels, below which immigration has little effect and above
which immigration has dramatic effects. On the other hand, it is possible that beyond
a certain level of immigration, the impact of immigration on far-right voting levels of.
To examine these possibilities, we consider several different functional forms to model
the impact of immigration on FPO¨ votes. For example, we add a quadratic term of the
immigration share to our model, but this quadratic term does not enter significantly.
Alternatively, we run regressions allowing for different slopes at different levels. Results
available on request show that the slope of the relationship between immigration and
FPO¨ voting is essentially homogenous. Specifically, the confidence intervals of the various
point estimates at different immigration levels all are such that a common slope of 0.159,
as estimated in column (1) of Table 4, cannot be rejected. We conclude that the simple
linear model captures the immigration effect quite well.
Overall, we obtain evidence of a strong association between the share of immigrants
and electoral support for the FPO¨ within communities, i.e., when controlling for unob-
served time-invariant heterogeneity. The relationship is quantitatively relevant: A one
percentage-point increase in the share of immigrants is associated with a 0.16 percentage-
point increase in the FPO¨ vote share in that community. This implies that a one standard
deviation increase in the local share of immigrants is associated with a 0.11 standard de-
viation increase in the FPO¨ vote share.
19While including a large set of controls as in our main specifications clearly has the advantage of
mitigating the possibility that an important variable remains omitted, it does have a drawback: Some
characteristics of the resident population may themselves be influenced by immigration (for instance,
via their participation in the local labor market). We, therefore, also reestimate our models using a
more parsimonious specification (controlling for the community’s number of inhabitants, the number of
inhabitants squared, the natives’ age-sex-distribution (22 groups), the natives’ distribution of marital
status (shares of inhabitants who are single, married, divorced, and widowed)). Table B.2 in the Supple-
mentary Appendix B shows that the results continue to hold for this minimal specification. We further
confirmed the robustness of our results to the exclusion of observations of larger cities (more than 180.000
inhabitants).
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4.2 What drives the association of immigration and far-right voting?
A natural starting point for understanding voting decisions is the hypothesis that rational
and self-interested individuals vote for the party which promises them the greatest utility
(Downs, 1957). We focus on two specific channels through which immigration is likely to
affect voter welfare: labor market competition and neighbourhood quality.
First, economic theory suggests that immigration hurts natives supplying production
factors closely substitutable by those of immigrants. In contrast, individuals who supply
complementary factors will gain from immigration. Presenting anti-immigration plat-
forms, far-right parties should appeal to voters who lose from immigration. Specifically,
low-skill immigration would be perceived as particularly problematic by Austrian voters.
Moreover, we hypothesize that voters in high-unemployment communities and in com-
munities with strong labor market competition among natives and immigrants should be
more inclined to the far right in response to immigration.
Second, the natives’ assessments of the impact of immigration on “compositional
amenities” that they derive from their neighbourhoods, schools, and workplaces can be
an important source of anti-immigration sentiments, as documented in Card et al. (2012).
(See also Hainmueller and Hiscox (2010) and Dustmann and Fabbri (2003).) Education
is likely to play a key role. On the one hand, a stronger effect of low-skilled immigration
than of high-skilled immigration is also consistent with the compositional amenities argu-
ment. On the other hand, we hypothesize that communities with many educated voters
(who are likely to worry most about the quality of schooling) and communities with a
lot of immigrant children would be more likely to lean to the far right when immigration
increases.
4.2.1 Heterogeneous effects by immigrant groups
We first investigate how the education levels of immigrants affect voting decisions of
natives. We construct two groups of immigrants according to educational attainment,
distinguishing between low- and medium-skilled immigrants on the one hand and high-
skilled immigrants on the other hand. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 4 present the results.
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We find strong evidence that low-skilled immigration is strongly positively associated with
far-right voting. By contrast, high-skilled immigration has a negative sign. A one standard
deviation increase in the local share of low-skilled (high-skilled) immigrants is associated
with a 0.15 (0.13) standard deviation increase (decrease) in the FPO¨ vote share.
We also considered the possible role of cultural and ethnic distance relative to the
native population as a driver of anti-immigration voting support. Immigrants from Turkey
and ex-Yugoslavia have historically been the most important ethnic groups. They are
also among those most often exposed to public verbal attacks by right-wing extremists.
Since most Turkish immigrants are Muslim, the effects of Turkish immigrants essentially
also capture the role of religion.20 Results available on request show a somewhat stronger
association of these immigrants with FPO¨ voting. However, contrary to the results for the
role of the education level of immigrants, these differential results later are not supported
in the IV estimations.
4.2.2 Heterogeneous effects across communities
In this subsection, we explore which community characteristics interact with immigration
to generate political support for the far right. In Table 5, we consider four sample splits
along the following community characteristics: (i) unemployment among natives, (ii) labor
market competition between immigrants and natives, (iii) ratio of immigrant kids to native
kids, and (iv) average educational attainment of natives.21
In Panel A, we find that the impact of immigration varies with the level of unemploy-
ment of Austrians. In communities where the unemployment rate of Austrians is on the
top quartile, the effect of immigration is nearly twice as big than in communities with
unemployment in the bottom quartile. In Panel B we consider more directly the intensity
of competition between immigrants and Austrians. Following Card (2001), we construct
20Evidence from the UK suggests that Muslims integrate less and more slowly than non-Muslims (Bisin
et al., 2008).
21Samples are split according to the distribution of the respective variable observed in 1981. Notice that
the sample splits themselves may be subject to endogeneity concerns in that, for example, communities
in the top 25th percentile in one dimension are likely different also in other dimensions. It is possible
that our control variables do not capture all other differences.
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an index of skill overlap among immigrants and natives.22 The results imply that the
impact of immigration is stronger where immigrants and Austrians are more likely to
compete. In results available on request, we compute an alternative index which uses
industry information, and we obtain results pointing in the same direction.23
[ Insert Table 5 here ]
Panel C considers the role of the education level of natives. Specifically, we split the
sample according to the average educational attainment of natives, based on a four-point
scale drawing on the four levels of education described in the data section. The natives’
education can be relevant in this context for two reasons. On the one hand, high native
education makes it likely that incoming immigrants have relatively lower education. Thus,
these immigrants are less likely to compete with the natives on the labor market. Well-
educated natives would, therefore, benefit from low-skilled immigration. We would then
expect the impact of immigration on FPO¨ voting to be less pronounced where Austrians
are highly educated. On the other hand, high-skilled natives may particularly worry about
the quality of schools and other compositional amenities. The results in Panel C suggest
that the latter effect dominates. Another reason for the result of Panel C could be that
in communities with more high-skilled natives, political polarization may be stronger,
generating stronger FPO¨ support among the potential losers.
Finally, Panel D documents that proximity of immigrants is especially strongly related
to far-right voting where there are many immigrant children compared to Austrian chil-
22Specifically, we compute the following index C. Let fAj and f
I
j denote the fractions of Austrians (A)
and immigrants (I) with education level j. For the calculation of this index, we use all six education levels
compulsory schooling, completed apprenticeship training, lower secondary school, higher secondary school
or academic degree separately. Let fj denote the fraction of the overall workforce with this education
level. Consider an increase in the population of immigrations that generates a 1-percentage-point increase
in the total workforce. Assuming that the new immigrants have the same education distribution as the
existing immigrants, the percentage increase in the workforce of skill level j is f Ij /fj . For Austrians, the
weighted average increase in the supply of labor to their education-specific labor markets is given by
CA,I =
∑
j f
A
j f
I
j /fj , which is the competition index. This index is 1 if Austrians and immigrants in a
particular community have the same distribution of education levels. It can be greater than 1 if they have
similar education level distributions, and if both Austrians and immigrants are concentrated in a subset
of education levels. The index is 0 if Austrians and immigrants have completely different education levels.
23More than half of all immigrants are employed in construction, trade, hotel and restaurants, and real
estate/entrepreneurial services. While roughly 40% of Austrians are also employed in these sectors on
average, there is wide variation across communities in the importance of these industries. We find that
where a larger fraction of Austrians is employed in these industries, the effect of immigration is stronger.
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dren, indicating that Austrians worry about the quality and cultural composition of their
schools.24
4.3 The effect of immigration on outcomes that might affect voting behavior
The above findings are consistent with the labor-market competition channel. They are
also consistent with the idea that Austrians worry about compositional amenities. Al-
though voting does not have to be fully rational, rationality would have a stronger claim
to explaining the results if immigration in fact worsens labor market opportunities for
natives or reduces the quality of schooling or the quality of other amenities. Also, we
study whether natives respond only through voting decisions, or whether they also use
the exit option, migration.
Labor market effects A large (and controversial) literature discusses the actual labor
market effects of immigration. Some studies (for example, Borjas, 2003) find strong neg-
ative effects on native wages, while others do not find strong effects (for example, Card,
2005, 2009).25
There are a few studies analyzing the labor market implications of immigration on
the native population in Austria. Winter-Ebmer and Zweimu¨ller (1996) and Winter-
Ebmer and Zweimu¨ller (1999) find no significant effects on earnings and employment
following the immigration wave of the early 1990s on young Austrian natives. The result
of these early studies has been confirmed more recently by Bock-Schappelwein et al.
(2008) who find no statistically significant impact of immigration on natives in micro
wage regressions; and Horvath (2011) who finds that increases in immigration had no
significant impact on the lower part of the native wage distribution but a slightly positive
and statistically significant impact on the top of the distribution. In sum, the available
Austrian evidence does not strongly support the idea that native wages are strongly
affected by immigration. However, the evidence is scarce and even if it precisely measures
24In the case of this sample split, a separate calculation below the 25th percentile is not feasible, since
in the year 1981 more than 25 percent of the communities had no underage immigrants.
25The impact of immigration on the size of the consumer base plays a critical role, complicating
theoretical predictions of labor-market effects (Borjas, 2009).
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the true effect of immigration on the labor market, it is perceived rather than actual threat
by immigrants that matters for voting behaviour of natives. European and World Values
Survey based evidence indeed suggests that Austrians perceive immigrants as a threat for
their labor market opportunities (see Table C.3 in Supplementary Appendix C).
Effects on compositional amenities Voting for the far right may be driven by the
impact of immigration by affecting the quality of the local neighbourhoods (schools, work-
places, residential areas, etc.) For instance, Speciale (2012) shows that public education
expenditures in EU-15 countries are lower the higher the influx of immigrants. In order to
shed light on this potentially important channel, we consider several proxies for composi-
tional amenities and measure whether they respond to an increase in local immigrantion.26
First, we consider schooling quality in a community. School quality for native children
may either be lower due to less funding in high-immigration communities or due to the
mere fact that a large fraction classmates with immigration families who are not fluent
in German, may have a detrimental effect for native children due to a lower quality of
teaching. There are no direct measures available in Austria. In particular, a standard-
ized high school test was only introduced in 2014/15. Therefore, we construct a proxy.
Specifically, we measure the fraction of school children that are commuting more than
15 minutes to school, which very often means that they commute to another community.
This information is provided in the census until 2001. Such out-commuting reflects the
combination of two factors, both of which indicate lower schooling quality in the home
community: first, there may not be a high school or gymnasium in a community; second,
there may be a school, but with many immigrant children. For this variable, data are
not available for 2011. One average about 40% of school children out-commute, and this
number is slightly decreasing over the years. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 6 show that
a one standard deviation increase in the local share of immigrants is associated with a
26An important literature — which we do not discuss here — considers whether and to which extent
immigration causes crime. This large and increasing literature did so far not generate conclusive evidence,
with some studies finding positive, and other studies finding insignificant effects. However, it seems that
the fear of becoming a crime victim is associated with immigration. See, for example, Bianchi et al. (2012)
for a discussion of the recent literature. While we think crime (or fear of crime) may be an important
mechanism that drives voting in response to immigration, lack of appropriate regional data does not allow
us to study this in this paper.
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0.10-0.14 standard deviation increase in the share of children who out-commute, consis-
tent with the idea that natives worry that immigration may cause disamenities through
lower school quality.
[ Insert Table 6 here ]
Second, we consider to whether immigration affects the probability that a community
has one of the following two (public or publicly supported) child-care facilities available:
a day-care for children of up to age 3 (“Kinderkrippe”) or after-school child care for school
children at ages 6+ (“Hort”).27 Data on the existence of these facilities are available from
1991 onwards. The provision of these facilities has been increasing. For example, while in
1991, 40.5% of the population had access to a day nursery in their community, that share
had increase to 51% in 2011. Similarly, while in 1991, there were afternoon care centers
in the community for 47% of the population, in 2011, 59% of the population had access
to such a facility.
We are primarily interested in whether there are differential trends in public child-
care provision between high- and low-immigration communities. The hypothesis is that
policy makers may be more strongly focused on the voting population and hence may al-
locate fewer funds to communities with a stronger increase in immigration. Consequently,
the availability of childcare facilities may grow less in high-immigration communities.
Columns (3) and (4) provide evidence supporting this hypothesis for after-school care
(“Hort”). A one percentage point increase in the local share of immigrants is associated
with a 0.9 to 1.2 percentage point decrease in the probability that after-school care is
available in a community.28 For day nurseries (“Kinderkrippen”), we find no significant
result.
Overall, our results support the idea that high-immigration communities did benefit
to a lesser extent from (the growth of) local amenities related to care for school- and pre-
27In most Austrian schools, teaching ends at noon or 2 p.m. Day care for kids aged 3-6 (Kindergarten)
is available in almost all communities.
28It is possible that immigrants are more likely than natives to provide afternoon care themselves, and
so less such services need to be provided externally. We do not have data to examine this conjecture
directly. Our dependent variable in this analysis is whether there is after-school care available, not how
many places there are in a given facility.
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school children. This lower extent of child-related amenities may create worries for insuffi-
cient child-support children by native parents for their own children. This, in turn, could
induce them to find anti-immigrant slogans attractive and to support anti-immigration
policies by voting for the FPO¨.
Native migration Austrians may respond in various ways if increased immigration
makes them increasingly dissatisfied with the quality of their neighbourhoods. In par-
ticular, they may vote for an anti-immigration party (“voice”), or they may move away
(“exit”). Although this paper focuses on the voting reaction, the native migration patterns
are of interest: If Austrians who worry about immigrants were to move away, the over-
all impact of immigration on far-right support will be understated by our analysis. The
reason is that voters whose welfare is negatively affected by the proximity of immigrants
(and who would, therefore, more readily gravitate to the FPO¨) who are more likely to
have moved elsewhere, thus weakening the relationship between immigration and FPO¨
support observed at the community level.
To test for the importance of native internal migration responses, we follow Peri and
Sparber (2011). The question is how many natives (N) respond to the arrival of immi-
grants (I) by leaving their place of residence i. To estimate the quantitative importance
of such migration responses, the following model is estimated: ∆Ni,t = α+ β ·∆Ii,t + ui,t
with β being the interesting parameter. Various scholars have proposed different versions
of this model, mainly considering different measurement concepts of dependent and inde-
pendent variables. We use the slightly modified specification of Card (2001, 2007), which
is the preferred specification of Peri and Sparber (2011).
Table 7 summarizes the estimation output of three empirical models for our community-
level panel data. Column (1) shows that, overall, there is no evidence of a strong internal
migration response of Austrians. This evidence is in line with the common stereotype
that the Austrian population is not very mobile. Frictions in the housing market may
also make internal migration difficult.
Turning to skill groups (columns (2) to (4)), it is interesting to note that we do
not find evidence of Austrians moving away from (or into) communities with substantial
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low-skilled immigration. This suggests that the impact of low-skilled immigration on
voting outcomes is primarily due to changing preferences of existing voters, not due to a
changing composition of the electorate. However, we obtain some suggestive evidence that
for Austrians, moving into communities with recent inflows of high-skilled immigration
is attractive. As long as these movers do not support the FPO¨, this finding can partly
explain why high-skilled immigration is associated with less FPO¨ voting.
[ Insert Table 7 here ]
5 Instrumental variables
In this section we propose an instrumental variables (IV) strategy for identifying the effects
of immigration on FPO¨ votes. This is of interest because even a fixed effects regression
does not necessarily identify the causal effect of local immigration on local FPO¨ votes due
to time-varying unobserved heterogeneity. Specifically, a concern is that a community
may be hit by a negative economic shock which depresses housing prices, making it more
affordable for immigrants to settle there. At the same time, this shock may incline voters
to the far right. Although we control for a rich and time-varying set of economic and
demographic variables, as well as the industry structure, it is not possible to rule out this
concern in the fixed-effects setting.
Our identification strategy relies on historical settlement patterns (see Altonji and
Card (1991)), an instrument which is frequently used in immigration studies. It turns out
that this instrument works in many (though not in all) of our regressions. Particularly
when we look at certain subgroups, the first stage runs into statistical problems. Overall,
the results of this section provide an important complement to our fixed effects results.
5.1 Background and IV strategy
Historical settlement into Austria is characterized by a sudden, large inflow of immigrants
in the 1960s. Until the early 1960s very few non-Austrians lived in Austria (except a base
stock of Germans whose overall size remained essentially unchanged for the following 30
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years). However, in the 1950s and 1960s, the post-war boom of the Austrian economy
led to a growing demand for labor amid increasing labor shortages. In the 1960s, the
Austrian government began to forge bilateral agreements with southern and southeastern
European states to recruit temporary workers. A 1964 agreement with Turkey and a
1966 agreement with Yugoslavia attracted Turkish and Yugoslavian “guest workers” into
the country. Recruitment offices in those countries were established, and a substantial
influx of Turkish and Yugoslavian workers to Austria began. Some raw numbers illustrate
the significance of this new regime. In 1961, residents with Turkish and Yugoslavian
citizenship numbered 271 and 4, 565, respectively. By 1971, the numbers had risen 60-
fold and 20-fold to 16, 423 and 93, 337, respectively. These guest workers were supposed
to stay, by way of rotation, only for a short period of time to cover specific demand for
labor. However, they usually wanted to stay longer, and Austrian employers wanted to
avoid the cost of labor fluctuations. Thus, in effect, most of the guest workers remained
in Austria permanently.
Archival information provides interesting insights into how allocations of guest workers
were made in the 1960s. Specifically, the actual number of guest workers in a given com-
munity arises out of a combination of two factors: First, the maximum number of guest
workers a specific industry in a given region was allocated (the quota); and second, the
usage of that quota. The quota was the outcome of regional and industry-specific negoti-
ations between representatives of the Austrian Economic Chambers and the trade unions.
The Austrian Institute of Economic Research (Wirtschaftsforschungsinstitut, WIFO) pro-
vides an analysis of how this worked for the year 1963 (WIFO, 1963). They find that there
does not appear to be a clear pattern in the extent to which quotas were set and used.
They note that this may have to do with the institutional peculiarities of the various labor
markets and that“subjective factors such as negotiation skills”apparently played a role (p.
413, translation by the authors). Moreover, studying the relationship between industry
structure and immigrant quotas, they conclude that “the quota size was apparently only
partially determined based on labor market data. Quotas are neither positively related to
the percentage of vacancies, nor are they negatively related with the unemployment rate”
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(p. 413). As regards unemployment in 1961, the WIFO analysis (based on regional data)
suggests that quotas for immigrants were higher for regions were unemployment was low.
To be on the safe side, we do control for the historical unemployment rate in our analysis.
Naturally, immediate family members later joined the predominantly male guest work-
ers. However, in the following decades (for example, during the Yugoslavian political crisis
in 1990 and the war in 1992) a massive influx beyond immediate family members took
place. A large literature has established that immigrants settle where they find existing
social networks and neighbors with the same cultural and linguistic background (Bartel,
1989; A˚slund, 2005; Jaeger, 2007). Therefore, we expect that immigrants today are highly
likely located in areas where the first wave of guest workers settled down in the 1960s.29
Following Card (2001), therefore, we use the spatial distribution of immigrants in
the census-year 1971 — which reflects the settlement patterns of the first wave of guest
workers — to decompose the actual stock/inflow of immigrants into an exogenous so-called
supply-push component and into a residual component reflecting any departures from the
historical pattern. Put differently, the idea is to exploit the differential location choices
of immigrants from different countries in the 1960s to predict the settlement decisions
of immigrants from the same country at later points in time. This predicted share of
immigrants should be free from local contemporary demand factors and as such serve as
a valid source of exogenous variation.
Importantly, to ameliorate endogeneity concerns even further, we adopt a regression-
in-changes approach. In other words, rather than exploiting the cross-sectional variation
in levels of FPO¨ votes and immigrant shares, we exploit the cross-sectional variation in
changes in FPO¨ votes and immigrant shares. This is the natural counterpart to the panel
29Empirical papers show that such networks facilitate the job search and assimilation into the new
cultural environment (Munshi, 2003). For the importance of networks in general, see Calvo´-Armengol
and Jackson (2004), Ioannides and Loury (2004), Lazear (1999), and Montgomery (1991).
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regressions with community fixed effects.30
5.2 Empirical implementation
Formally, we wish to explain the change in FPO¨ vote share in community i from t1 to t2
by the change in the immigrant share in the same time period. As we show below, when
using percentage point changes for both immigrant shares and FPO¨ vote shares, the first
stage is, once one includes our main control variables, unfortunately too weak to allow for
reliable inference. With percent changes in immigrant shares, we obtain a much stronger
first stage and, therefore, more reliable inferences. Therefore, we also use percent changes
in FPO¨ vote shares as the dependent variable.31 In what follows, for simplicity we present
the regression setup using this main specification.
In particular, we instrument the percent change in immigration since any given base
year t1 by the percent change in the predicted share of immigrants from t1 to t2. Using
“g” to highlight “growth” variables, the first-stage regression then is
gIMMit2t1 = a+ b ∗ gIVit2t1 + X′it1Γ1 + d ∗ IMMi1971 + θ1t + ε1it, (1)
where gIMMit denotes the percent change in the immigrant share in community i from
t1 to t2, Xit1 is a vector of standard controls, θ
1
t is a full set of year dummies, and ε
1
it is a
stochastic error term.
The instrumental variable, the percent change in the predicted share of immigrants, is
gIVit2t1 =
(
∑
c Sci +Mct2 · λci)/Pit2 − (
∑
c Sci +Mct1 · λci)/Pit1
(
∑
c Sci +Mct1 · λci)/Pit1
. (2)
30In specific circumstances, related to policies regarding refugees, researchers can arguably get even
closer to random assignment and internal validity than we can in our setting (see, for example, Edin,
Fredriksson and A˚slund (2003), Damm (2009), Glitz (2012), and Dahlberg et al. (2012)). Strict exogeneity
is not definitely guaranteed even in these settings. In reality, authorities consider at least the location of
family members or ethnic clusters. Also, in Austria, for example, communities may deny to provide (or
to find) housing for assigned refugees. Moreover, these cases represent a quantitatively less important
phenomenon, and it may be more difficult to generalize findings from the refugee assignment approach
to a situation where economic migrants decide independently where to settle.
31Naturally, when there are zero immigrants in a community or zero FPO¨ voters, a percent change
cannot be calculated. In the few cases where this occurs, we impute one immigrant or one vote. Excluding
these observations provides virtually identical results. We also verify that the prior panel fixed effects
results are virtually identical on this slightly restricted sample.
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Here Sci is the number of immigrants from source country c residing in community
i in the year 1971, Mctj is the number of immigrants from source country c who enter
Austria between 1971 and tj, λci is the fraction of immigrants from the pre-1971 cohort
of immigrants from source country c who resided in community i in 1971, and Pitj is
the total population (i. e., immigrants plus natives) in community i in the year tj. The
country groups c are: immigrants from Ex-Yugoslavia, Turkey and others. We thus
calculate time-varying instruments for various combinations of t1 = 1981, 1991, 2001 and
t2 = 1991, 2001, 2011 and assign them to election years per the timing convention described
in Section 2. The results are very similar if we do not include Sci in the construction of
the instrumental variable.
The second-stage regression then is
gFPO¨it2t1 = α + β ∗ ĝIMM it2t1 + X′it1Γ2 + δ ∗ IMMi1971 + θ2t + ε2it, (3)
where gFPO¨it2t1 is the percent change of FPO¨ votes in community i t1 to t2; and
ĝIMM it2t1 is the predicted percent change in immigration from the first-stage regres-
sion (1). Moreover, θ2t is a set of year fixed effects, and ε
2
it is the error term.
The coefficient of interest is β, which captures the effect of the change in the local
presence of immigrants (attracted by existing networks established by guest workers prior
to 1971) on the change in FPO¨ voting. Specifically, β measures the percent change in
FPO¨ votes that is associated with a one percent increase in the immigrant share in a
community. As in the OLS case, we weight observations by community population size.
Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity of unknown form, and in the case of panel
regressions clustered on the community and census year levels.
When our interest is in the effect of immigration of a specific skill-group, we construct
an analogous instrument, using the initial skill-level distribution instead of the initial
source country distribution for predicting the allocation of a given inflow of immigrants
to communities.
We have shown earlier that Austrian voters do not appear to internally migrate in
response to immigration. Moreover, there does not seem to be a relationship between
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historical Nazi-voting and immigration patterns in 1971. As in the previous panel regres-
sions, we control for a range of controls, including the historical (pre-immigrant inflow)
industry structure and unemployment rates.32 In addition to the covariates used in the
previous section, we also control for the immigrant share in 1971 (though the results do
not depend on including this variable). Note that the immigrant share in 1971 is included
as a control in both stages. In other words, if suffices to assume that the initial distribu-
tion λgi of immigrant groups (but not the levels Sgi) and the subsequent overall inflows
to Austria are exogenous.
5.3 IV results
First-stage results. The geographic distribution of immigrants by census year is de-
picted in Figure 3. Visual inspection strongly suggests that the share of immigrants in
later years is higher in communities with a high immigrant share back in 1971. This
also translates into a strong relation between predicted and actual shares of immigrants,
as demonstrated in the top row of Figure 4. Notice, however, that our IV approach re-
lies on changes. The middle row of Figure 4 shows a positive correlation between the
predicted percentage point change in immigrant shares and actually observed percentage
point changes in the immigrant share, for various relevant time horizons. However, when
including control variables, the first stage in percentage point changes is too weak, yield-
ing F-statistics33 of only 0.3 to 4, as can be seen in the lower panel of Table 8 in columns
(3), (5), and (7).
32In fact, our results do not depend on controlling on these historical variables. Consistent with
this observation, unreported results show no significant relation between our instrumental variable and
the unemployment rate in the year 1961. Also, because contemporaneous unemployment itself is highly
positively correlated with FPO¨ vote shares, omitting the control for labor market status would, if anything,
tend to introduce a downward bias into our second-stage estimates. Nonetheless, we control for the whole
contemporaneous labor market distribution.
33We report Wald F -statistics based on the Kleibergen-Paap rk statistic. The Cragg-Donald F -statistic
is a basic reference point in 2SLS-regressions; Stock, Wright and Yogo (2002) provide critical values for
strong instruments (8.96 in the case of one instrument). However, this statistic requires an assumption
of i.i.d. errors. In the presence of clustering and heteroskedasticity, the Kleibergen-Paap rk statistic is,
therefore, typically considered additionally in practice. No study appears to exist that provides threshold
values that the rk statistic should exceed for weak identification not to be considered a problem, but
researchers usually use a value of 10 as an indication of a strong instrument in this case, following the
general proposal of Staiger and Stock (1997) for a threshold for the first-stage F -statistic. The cutoff
values do not provide a mechanical rule.
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[ Insert Figures 3 and 4 here ]
Therefore, we consider percent changes. The bottom row of Figure 4 shows that a
positive correlation between the instrument, the predicted percent change in immigrant
shares, and actually observed percent changes in the immigrant share exists. In this case,
the first stage is strong, as can be seen at the bottom of Table 8 in columns (4), (6),
and (8) in the high F -statistics on the excluded instrument, at least in the 15-20 year
differences and the 20+ year differences. The Kleibergen-Paap statistics in our analysis
are between 10 and 35. An increase in the predicted share by one percent is associated
with a 0.9 to one percent higher actual immigrant share. Results vary only slightly by
the corresponding time horizon (<15 years, >20 years).34 Our main inferences in the IV
setting are, therefore, based on the specification in percent changes.
[ Insert Table 8 here ]
Second-stage: main results. The upper Panel of Table 8 presents the main second-
stage results for three different time horizons over which changes in the immigrant share
can be measured (around 10 years, 15 years, and 20 years, respectively). The regressions
are based on pooled samples. For instance, in the 20-year differences regression we pool
vote share changes from 1979 to 1999, from 1979 to 2002, and from 1990 to 2013 (and
their corresponding first-stage regressions for immigrant share changes from 1981 to 2001
and from 1991 to 2011). We proceed similarly for the pooled samples underlying the 15-
and 10-year-difference regressions.
The second-stage results for the main specification in columns (4), (6), and (8) indicate
that there is a significantly positive effect of increases in overall immigration (all skill
groups) on increases in FPO¨ votes. The results do not depend on the particular time
horizon over which the immigration change is measured. Like the prior results, these
34Results available on request show that these effects also hold in a quantitatively very similar form
for individual differences (e.g., going from 1981 to 2001, from 1991 to 2001, etc.). There is only one
exception: for changes over the period 2001 to 2011, the coefficient falls to 0.31, suggesting that inflows
in that decade may have become less determined by prior settlement patterns in recent years. However,
even then the effect is highly statistically significant, ensuring a strong first stage even in most recent
years.
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findings are robust to the inclusion or exclusion of covariates.35 Columns (3), (5), and
(7) show that, when using percentage point changes on the left-hand and right-hand
sides of the regression, due to the weak first stage, the second-stage coefficient becomes
implausibly large.
We report standardized beta coefficients to evaluate the quantitative importance of the
estimated effects. The results in the main specification regressions (4), (6), and (8) imply
that a one standard deviation increase in the dependent variable causes about a one tenth
of a standard deviation increase in FPO¨ vote shares. For comparison, column (2) shows
the results from a fixed-effects estimation, using a log-log specification (which closely
corresponds to the estimation in percent changes). Column (1) records the previously
obtained result from the main fixed-effects regression specification, respectively. The
standardized beta coefficients imply that the quantitative results of the IV-estimation
match well with the estimates from either of the two panel fixed effects approaches.
A possible drawback of the percent change specification is that the further away one
moves from the mean immigrant or FPO¨ vote share, the more the predicted effects on
vote shares of the same percentage point increase in the immigrant share will vary. Be-
cause the first stage in the percentage point specification is too weak, we cannot directly
compare the quantitative effects for the two IV approaches. In analyses available on re-
quest, the percentage point specifications and the log-log specifications yield quite similar
quantitative predictions in the fixed effects models. However, the log-log specification
creates a somewhat larger residual variance, which supports using the percentage-point
specification in the fixed effects regressions presented in Section 4. In the IV setting, the
percent-change specification is the only viable option in light of the stronger first stage
that obtains with this approach. Overall, IV approach and the previous fixed effects
approach yield a consistent picture: the relationship between the regional immigrant in-
35See Table B.2 in the Supplementary Appendix B. We have also analyzed second-stage results for
changes between individual years. All individual differences show a positive relationship between changes
in immigration changes in FPO¨ voting, and most (though not all) individual differences are statistically
significant. The effect of immigration is somewhat bigger when considering changes in the more recent
15 years than in the first 15 years, though the confidence intervals are overlapping. These findings
are available on request. Moreover, we have omitted outliers in terms of predicted percent changes in
immigrant shares. The results are unaffected.
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flow and the regional increase in FPO¨ votes is statistically significant and quantitatively
important.
[ Insert Table 9 here ]
Heterogeneous effects by immigrant groups. Table 9 reports results for low-skilled
and high-skilled immigration separately. The table also contains the overall results for
comparison. For low-skilled workers, we find results consistent with the panel fixed effects
estimates: Increases in low-skilled immigration are significantly associated with increases
in FPO¨ votes (in the 20+ year regressions, the effect is positive but not significant). For
high-skilled immigration, we find negative point estimates throughout, though the second-
stage estimates are not statistically significant. The first stages generally perform well for
both low- and high-skilled immigration changes.36
Heterogeneous effects across communities. In Table 10, we present IV-estimates
splitting the sample by the same set of variables (that potentially interact with immi-
gration in explaining FPO¨ votes) as in Table 5 above. We present results for the 15-year
changes. (First-stage results were strongest for this time difference, increasing the chance
to obtaining useful first stages also in split samples. Indeed, 13 out of 16 first-stage regres-
sions yield Kleibergen-Paap statistiscs of above 10, despite the much smaller samples.)
Panels A and B of Table 10 show that the strongest impact of immigrant inflows on
far-right voting occurs in Austrian communities with high unemployment and in commu-
nities where native-immigrant labor market competition is high. Panel C documents that
the effect of immigration is larger in communities with a large share of highly-educated
Austrians. The sample split according to the number of immigrant children does not yield
quite the same picture as before (see Panel D). However, the strongest effect does again
occur in the highest quartile of immigrant children presence. Overall, these results are in
line with the findings from the panel fixed effects estimations, although in the IV analysis
36We separately instrument the two immigration types because we had found some evidence earlier
that there is a slight migration response to high-skilled immigration. When we jointly instrument both
low/and high-skill immigration by the respective changes in the predicted shares for the respective years,
we obtain stronger results. These findings are available on request.
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the differences across groups are less significant. In sum, the findings provide support
for the conclusion that voter worries about both labor market effects and compositional
amenities may be important in explaining the increase in FPO¨ votes.
[ Insert Table 10 here ]
Effects on compositional amenities. Finally, Table 11 presents IV results on other
outcomes (availability of public childcare, school commuting) that might be detrimentally
affected by an increase in immigration and hence might partly induce voters to lean
towards an anti-immigration far-right political party.
Consistent with the panel fixed effects regressions, we find strong evidence that after-
noon care is less likely to be made available in communities with substantial low-skilled
immigration. We also find similar results for day nurseries in the IV regressions. By
contrast, using the IV strategy, we do not obtain significant evidence of an effect of immi-
gration on the tendency of Austrian parents sending their children to non-local schools.
[ Insert Table 11 here ]
Overall, a broadly similar picture as in the fixed effects regression emerges. There is
suggestive, but not extremely strong evidence of negative effects of immigration on the
compositional amenities. As mentioned earlier, the various amenities considered here are
by no means an exhaustive list but should be considered as potentially relevant examples.
Immigration may drive political preferences through affecting other amenities such as the
housing market, crime, or environmental quality (that we did not consider here due lack of
appropriate data). Future work should explore where these additional types of amenities
are relevant for far-right voting.
6 Conclusions
International migration flows have been strongly increasing over the last decades. The
United Nations (2016) report 244 million international migrants worldwide (76 million in
Europe) in 2015, up from 173 million (56 million in Europe) in 2000, with the largest
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increase in high-income countries. The large immigration flows and the way policy should
react to them have always been important policy topics. This is even more so in the face of
the current influx of refugees into Europe, where immigration now arguably ranks highest
on the policy agenda. What are the political consequences of increased immigration and
how does it affect voting behaviour of the electorate?
Political folklore holds that far-right parties attract voters by appealing to anti-immigration
sentiments of the voting native population. Yet, it is also possible that more contact with
immigrants could foster better understanding and ultimately a more positive attitude of
voters. While existing empirical studies often show a positive correlation between immi-
gration and votes for far-right political parties, empirical evidence establishing a causal
link is still scarce.
This paper studies the effect of the increasing presence of immigrants in one’s neigh-
bourhood on the change in election support for the far right. We look at the Freedom
Party of Austria (FPO¨) which, under the leadership of Jo¨rg Haider, increased its vote
share from less than 5 percent in the early 1980s to 27 percent in the late 1990s. The
FPO¨ obtained more than 20 percent of the vote in 2013. In the May 2016 Presiden-
tial election runoff, the FPO¨ candidate received 49.7% of votes, missing presidency very
closely.
We establish the following results. First, we find that a tenth of the cross-community
variation in the increase of (FPO¨) vote shares over time can be attributed to cross-
community variation in the inflow of immigrants. Our second result shows that the
composition of immigrants affects voting decisions. We document that low- and medium-
skilled immigration causes Austrian voters to turn to the far right, while more high-skilled
immigration either has an insignificant or a negative effect on FPO¨ votes. We caution
that education levels can capture many dimension and that communities with differing
skill levels of immigrants may differ along other dimensions. Third, the results are likely
due to both perceived labor market competition and a concern that immigration imposes
negative externalities associated with the composition of neighbourhoods, workplaces and
schools. The effects of immigration are stronger where unemployment among natives is
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high and where labor market competition between natives and immigrants is high, and
they are also stronger where there are many immigrant children and where natives are
highly educated. These results are consistent with the labor market channel and with the
compositional amenities channel. Fourth, there is suggestive evidence that immigration
is associated with a lower availability of childcare and makes Austrian kids more likely
to commute longer distances to school. This is consistent with the claim that Austrian
voters worry about the impact of immigration on compositional amenities. The set of
relevant amenities is clearly much broader than those considered here. Future research
should try to better understand which channels drive anti-immigration sentiments and
voting for anti-immigration parties.
Immigration is necessary for developed countries, as persistently low fertility rates
and increases in life expectancy let societies age. However, immigration is not a smooth
process, and it can generate tensions and conflicts. Our paper shows that the geographic
proximity of immigrants is an important driver of support for anti-immigration far-right
parties. Interestingly, in our analysis we found neither tipping points nor a levelling-off
phenomenon. Thus, if policies remain unchanged, a further influx of immigrants into a
community tends to continue to increase the vote share of the far right. Importantly,
low-skill immigration is seen as more problematic by voters than high-skill immigration.
A policy implication of this result is that fostering high-skilled immigration or the edu-
cation of currently low-skilled immigrants may be important also from the point of view
of political stability. Another conclusion of our analysis is that policies mitigating (per-
ceived or true) negative effects on compositional amenities by fostering the integration of
immigrants into local communities may be particularly important.
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Table 2. The effect of initial share of FPO¨ votes on the change in share of immigrants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable: 10-year difference 20-year difference
in share of immigrants in share of immigrants
Pooled ∆11-01 ∆01-91 ∆91-81 Pooled ∆11-91 ∆01-81
Panel A: All immigrants
Initial share of FPO¨ votes -0.013 -0.007 0.013 0.014 -0.007 -0.005 -0.019
(0.027) (0.011) (0.015) (0.020) (0.027) (0.020) (0.026)
Community characteristicsa in t1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Unemployment rate 1961b No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Industrial structure 1973b No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Community fixed effects Yes No No No Yes No No
Year fixed effects Yes No No No Yes No No
Number of observations 6,180 1,975 2,103 2,102 4,074 1,972 2,102
Mean of dependent variable 0.025 0.022 0.023 0.028 0.050 0.046 0.052
S.d. of dependent variable 0.025 0.026 0.023 0.026 0.040 0.040 0.039
FPO¨ votes measured in year ’79, ’90, ’99 1999 1990 1979 ’79, ’90 1990 1979
Mean of FPO¨ vote shares 0.165 0.273 0.167 0.062 0.113 0.168 0.062
S.d. of FPO¨ vote shares 0.101 0.061 0.058 0.037 0.072 0.058 0.037
Panel B: Low skilled immigrants
Initial share of FPO¨ votes 0.007 -0.005 0.014 0.006 0.003 -0.007 -0.007
(0.019) (0.010) (0.012) (0.015) (0.024) (0.016) (0.023)
Mean of dependent variable 0.017 0.011 0.016 0.022 0.033 0.027 0.039
S.d. of dependent variable 0.020 0.018 0.020 0.020 0.031 0.029 0.032
Panel C: High skilled immigrants
Initial share of FPO¨ votes -0.009 0.009∗∗ 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.016∗∗∗ -0.001
(0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Mean of dependent variable 0.008 0.014 0.004 0.006 0.015 0.019 0.011
S.d. of dependent variable 0.011 0.015 0.006 0.007 0.015 0.018 0.009
This table summarizes the estimated effect of the initial share of FPO¨ votes on the change in the share of immigrants in the following
10 or 20 years based on a series of weighted (community population weights) OLS estimations with community fixed effects using
Austrian community level data. The column header indicates which immigration share difference is used as the dependent variable,
and the row “FPO¨ votes measured in year” indicates the election year from which the investigation starts. For example, column (7)
presents a regression of the change in the share of immigrants in that community from years 1981 to 2001 on the share of FPO¨ votes
in a community in the year 1979. Columns (1) and (5) pool the respective 10- and 20-year difference regressions. Panel A considers
the share of residents without Austrian citizenship. The share of immigrants with a certain level of education is equal to the number of
residents without Austrian citizenship with the respective educational attainment as a fraction of all residents. Low and medium skills
is compulsory schooling, an apprenticeship or a lower secondary school. High education is a higher secondary school or an academic
degree. The shares of immigrants on a community-level are available in the years 1971, 1981, 1991, 2001 , 2011 (census years). Robust
standard errors (allowing for clustering on the community and census year levels and/or heteroskedasticity of unknown form) are in
parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10-percent level, 5-percent level, and 1-percent level, respectively.
a All regressions include as controls our standard set of community covariates: (1) each community’s number of inhabitants (and its
square), (2) the distribution of the labor market status (share of inhabitants who are employed, unemployed, retired or a child), (3)
the industry structure (31 variables that capture the share of workers employed in a certain industry relative to the sum of all workers
in a given community), (4) the distribution of marital status (share of inhabitants who are single, married, divorced or widowed), (5)
and the population’s age-sex-distribution. b The unemployment rate in 1961 and the industry structure in 1973 are time-invariant and
are, therefore, included in year-by-year regressions only.
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Table 3. The share of immigrants in 1971 as a function of votes for the DNSAP in
1930.
(1) (2)
Share of votes for DNSAP −0.001 −0.034
(0.068) (0.065)
Vienna Yes Yes
Carinthia Yes Yes
Inhabitants 1971 No Yes
No. of observations 111 111
R-squared 0.16 0.26
This table presents regressions of the share of immigrants in
1971 in political district i, where i = {1, . . . , 111}, on vote
shares for the Deutsche Nationalsozialistische Arbeiterpartei,
the Austrian counterpart of the German NSDAP, in 1930.
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Table 4. The effect of the share of immigrants on the share of FPO¨ votes: Fixed
effects estimation
(1) (2) (3)
Low High
All skilled skilled
immigrants immigrants immigrants
Share of immigrants 0.159∗∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗ −0.757∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.046) (0.111)
[0.107] [0.154] [−0.134]
Community characteristicsa Yes Yes Yes
Community fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 14,598 14,598 14,598
Mean of dependent variable 0.156 0.156 0.156
S.d. of dependent variable 0.094 0.094 0.094
Mean share of immigrants 0.073 0.057 0.014
S.d. of share of immigrants 0.063 0.048 0.017
This table summarizes the estimated effect of immigration on the share of votes for the FPO¨
based on a series of weighted (community population weights) OLS estimations with com-
munity fixed effects using Austrian community level data. The dependent variable (FPO¨it)
is equal to the share of votes for the FPO¨ in the general election in community i in the year
t, where t = {1979, 1983, 1990, 1994, 1999, 2002, 2013}. In column (1), the key explanatory
variable is the share of residents without Austrian citizenship. Columns (2) and (3) differen-
tiation immigrants by skill levels. The share of immigrants with a certain level of education
is equal to the number of residents without Austrian citizenship with the respective edu-
cational attainment as a fraction of all residents. Shares by skill are calculated based on
residents 25 years of age or older and refer to the highest attained educational degree. Low
and medium skills is compulsory schooling, an apprenticeship or a lower secondary school.
High education is a higher secondary school or an academic degree. The shares of immi-
grants on a community-level are available in the years 1971, 1981, 1991, 2001, 2011 (census
years). The share of immigrants in the years 1979 and 1983 is imputed with information
form the year 1981, the data in the years 1990 and 1994 are imputed with information form
the year 1991, the data in the years 1999 and 2002 are imputed with information from the
year 2001, and the data in the year 2013 are imputed with information form the year 2011.
The same imputation is used for the other covariates. Robust standard errors (allowing for
clustering on the community and census year levels and/or heteroskedasticity of unknown
form) are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10-percent
level, 5-percent level, and 1-percent level, respectively. Standardized (beta) coefficients are
in square brackets. aThe community characteristics are described in the notes to Table 2.
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Table 5. The role of labor market concerns and of compositional amenities for the
effect of the share of immigrants on the share of FPO¨ votes: Fixed effects estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Below Below Above Above t-statisticsa
25th 50th 50th 75th for the test of:
Sample split criterion percentile percentile percentile percentile (1)=(4) (2)=(3)
Panel A: Unemployment rate of natives
Share of immigrants 0.115∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗ 2.080 0.310
(0.035) (0.029) (0.050) (0.057) {0.038} {0.757}
[0.058] [0.073] [0.116] [0.183]
Mean of dependent var 0.148 0.145 0.160 0.162
Mean of split var 0.023 0.027 0.058 0.066
Panel B: Labor market competition
Share of immigrants 0.013 0.047 0.191∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗∗ 2.245 2.393
(0.043) (0.033) (0.050) (0.080) {0.025} {0.017}
[0.007] [0.037] [0.119] [0.097]
Mean of dependent var 0.137 0.151 0.158 0.160
Mean of split var 0.830 0.939 1.005 1.016
Panel C: Educational attainment of natives
Share of immigrants -0.041 -0.046 0.211∗∗∗ 0.267∗∗∗ 4.517 4.620
(0.045) (0.035) (0.043) (0.051) {0.001} {0.001}
[-0.010] [-0.013] [0.146] [0.190]
Mean of dependent var 0.139 0.144 0.159 0.159
Mean of split var 1.481 1.544 1.878 1.932
Panel D: Ratio of immigrant kids to all kids
Share of immigrants -0.045 0.207∗∗∗ 0.258∗∗∗ 4.788b 4.176
(0.044) (0.042) (0.046) {0.001} {0.001}
[-0.010] [0.142] [0.177]
Mean of dependent var 0.143 0.159 0.160
Mean of split var 0.019 0.101 0.121
This table summarizes the estimated effect of immigration on the share of votes for the FPO¨ based on a series
of weighted (community population weights) OLS estimations with community fixed effects using Austrian
community level data. The regressions are equivalent to those presented in Table 4, but are estimated for
different sub-samples. In each panel, the split variable is stated at the header. The columns (1) to (4)
indicate sample splits at the first quartile, the median, and the third quartile of the split variable stated
at the header of each column. Splits are conducted according to the distribution of the respective variable
observed in 1981. The construction of the labor market competition index (Panel B) follows Card (2001)
and is explained in detail in the text. Average educational attainment of natives (Panel C) is based on a
four-point scale, drawing on the four levels of education described in the data section. The calculation of
immigrant shares is described in the notes to Table 4. All regressions include the same set of controls as the
estimations summarized in Table 4. Robust standard errors (allowing for clustering on the community and
census year levels and/or heteroskedasticity of unknown form) are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10-percent level, 5-percent level, and 1-percent level, respectively. Standardized
(beta) coefficients are in square brackets. a Column (5) provides the t-statistics and p-values in curly brackets
for the hypothesis that the coefficients of interest in the subsamples from columns (1) and (4) are identical.
Column (6) provides the t-statistics and p-values in curly brackets for the hypothesis that the coefficients
of interest in the subsamples from columns (2) and (3) are identical. All t-statistics are based on fully
interacted models using the respective pooled samples and report the t-statistic on the coefficient of the
interaction term between the share of immigrants and a binary indicator for the second sample. b In the
case of Panel D, columns (2) and (4) are compared.
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Table 6. The effect of the share of immigrants on the child-care facilities and
commuting to school: Fixed effects estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: Proxy for low Hort : Kindergrippe:
quality of local Availability of a Availability of
schools: Share of after-school care a day nursery
out-commuting facility for children for children
Austrian students over 6 years under 3 years
Restricted Full Restricted Full Restricted Full
sample sample sample sample sample sample
(91,01) (81,91,01) (91,01) (91,01,11) (91,01) (91,01,11)
Share of immigrants 0.190∗∗∗ 0.290∗∗∗ −0.907∗∗ −1.191∗∗ 0.179 0.280
(0.073) (0.067) (0.411) (0.358) (0.254) (0.218)
[0.101] [0.140]
By skill group:
Low skilled immigrants 0.201∗∗ 0.324∗∗ −1.212∗∗∗ −1.53∗∗∗ 0.144 0.318
(0.084) (0.080) (0.457) (0.430) (0.264) (0.259)
[0.085] [0.125]
High skilled immigrants 0.300 0.109 2.192 1.078 0.748 1.136
(0.285) (0.312) (1.424) (0.763) (1.554) (0.738)
[0.034] [0.011]
Number of observations 4,209 6,311 4,209 6,185 4,209 6,185
Mean of dependent variable 0.398 0.400 0.500 0.531 0.430 0.456
Mean of share of immigrants 0.082 0.066 0.080 0.091 0.080 0.091
low skilled immigrants 0.064 0.053 0.063 0.069 0.063 0.069
high skilled immigrants 0.015 0.011 0.014 0.019 0.014 0.019
This table summarizes the estimated effect of immigration on compositional amenities based on a series of weighted (community
population weights) OLS estimations with community fixed effects using Austrian community level data. The dependent variables
are stated at the top of each column. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is the fraction of school children that are
commuting more than 15 minutes for their school. For this variable, data are not available for 2011. Column (1) shows results
for 1991 and 2001; column (2) shows results for 1981, 1991 and 2001. In columns (3) and (4), the dependent variable is a binary
indicator that is equal to 1 if a community offers an after-school care facility for children over 6 years (Hort), and 0 otherwise.
In columns (5) and (6), the dependent variable is a binary indicator that is equal to 1 if a community offers a day nursery
(Kinderkrippe). Day nurseries are day care facilities which are appropriate to the needs of babies and toddlers up to the age of
three. Data on the existence of day nurseries and after-school care facilities are available from 1991 onwards. Columns (3) and
(5) shows results for 1991 and 2001. Columns (4) and (6) show results for 1991, 2001, and 2011. The calculation of immigrant
shares is described in the notes to Table 4. All regressions include the same set of controls as the estimations summarized in
Table 4. Robust standard errors (allowing for clustering on the community and census year levels and/or heteroskedasticity of
unknown form) are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10-percent level, 5-percent level, and
1-percent level, respectively. Where appropriate, standardized (beta) coefficients are in square brackets.
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Table 7. Empirical models for identifying the internal migration response to a change
in share of immigrants by skill-levels of natives and immigrants
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Change in Change in
Change in Change in share of share of
share of share of high skilled low skilled
natives natives natives natives
Change in share of immigrants 0.024
(0.034)
[0.008]
By skill group:
Change in share of low skilled immigrants 0.009 0.013 -0.027
(0.047) (0.019) (0.046)
[0.003] [0.012] [ -0.011]
Change in share of high skilled immigrants 0.558∗∗∗ 0.365∗∗∗ 0.298∗∗
(0.150) (0.073) (0.130)
[0.189] [0.343] [ 0.119]
Number of observations 6,832 6,832 6,832 6,832
Mean of dependent variable 0.020 0.020 0.045 -0.023
S.d. of dependent variable 0.080 0.080 0.029 0.068
Mean of change in share of immigrants 0.015
Mean of change in share of low skilled immigrants 0.011 0.011 0.011
Mean of change in share of high skilled immigrants 0.004 0.004 0.004
This table summarizes estimation output of empirical models for identifying the internal migration response as dis-
cussed and evaluated by Peri and Sparber (2011) (henceforth PS). The estimations are based on Austrian community-
level panel data for the years 1981, 1991, 2001, and 2011. The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is defined
as (Nt − Nt−1)/(Nt−1 + It−1), where N denotes the absolute number of natives, and I the absolute number of
immigrants residing in the respective community in period t. The dependent variable in column (3) is defined as
(Nhight −Nhight−1 )/(Nt−1), where Nhigh denotes the absolute number of high-skilled natives. The dependent variable
in column (4) is defined as (N lowt −N lowt−1)/(Nt−1), , where N low denotes the absolute number of low-skilled natives.
The explanatory variable in column (1) is defined as (It − It−1)/(Nt−1 + It−1). The first explanatory variable in
column (2) to (4) is defined as (Ilowt − Ilowt−1)/(Nt−1 + It−1), where Ilow denotes the absolute number of high-skilled
immigrants. The second explanatory variable in column (2) to (4) is defined as (Ihight −Ihight−1 )/(Nt−1+It−1), where
Ihigh denotes the absolute number of high-skilled immigrants. Low skills is compulsory schooling, an apprenticeship
or a lower secondary school. High education is a higher secondary school or an academic degree. Each specification
controls for community and year fixed effects. This specification is analogous to the preferred specification of PS — a
slightly modified specification of Card (2001, 2007) — which they describe/recommend on page 90. A statistically
significant negative (positive) coefficient indicates displacement (attraction) of natives. Robust standard errors (al-
lowing for clustering on the community level) are in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at
the 10-percent level, 5-percent level, and 1-percent level, respectively. Standardized (beta) coefficients are in square
brackets.
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Table 10. The role of labor market concerns and of compositional amenities for the
effect of the change in the share of immigrants on the change in the share of FPO¨ votes:
IV estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Below Below Above Above t-statisticsa
25th 50th 50th 75th for the test of:
Sample split criterion percentile percentile percentile percentile (1)=(4) (2)=(3)
Panel A: Unemployment rate of natives
15-year percent change 0.054 0.033 0.056∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 1.026 0.611
in the immigrant share (0.049) (0.029) (0.025) (0.037) {0.305} {0.541}
[0.166] [0.084] [0.092] [0.148]
Mean of dep var 2.912 3.118 2.626 2.612
Mean of split var 0.032 0.035 0.055 0.065
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 48.824 17.947 15.687 6.950
Panel B: Labor market competition
15-year percent change 0.011 0.027∗ 0.066∗ 0.053∗ 1.112 0.893
in the immigrant share (0.017) (0.017) (0.040) (0.034) {0.266} {0.372}
[0.039] [0.067] [0.109] [0.095]
Mean of dep var 4.153 3.303 2.564 2.548
Mean of split var 0.977 0.989 1.003 1.003
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 10.320 14.937 42.761 25.433
Panel C: Educational attainment of natives
15-year percent change -0.014 0.013 0.059∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 2.032 1.213
in the immigrant share (0.040) (0.020) (0.032) (0.025) {0.042} {0.225}
[-0.031] [0.035] [0.092] [0.086]
Mean of dep var 4.595 3.944 2.494 2.292
Mean of split var 1.608 1.663 1.876 1.953
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 6.806 13.982 90.227 19.359
Panel D: Ratio of immigrant kids to all kids
15-year percent change 0.033∗ 0.061 0.229 0.977b 0.266
in the immigrant share (0.021) (0.103) (0.199) {0.329} {0.791}
[0.094] [0.030] [0.074]
Mean of dep var 3.950 2.441 2.298
Mean of split var 0.030 0.071 0.096
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 28.688 60.792 37.130
This table summarizes IV-estimations equivalent to those presented in column (4) of Table 9 for different sub-
samples. In each panel, the split variable is stated at the header. The columns (1) to (4) indicate sample splits at
the first quartile, the median, and the third quartile of the variable stated at the header of each column. Splits are
conducted according to the distribution of the respective variable observed in 1981. The construction of the labor
market competition index (Panel B) follows Card (2001) and is explained in detail in the text. Average educational
attainment of natives (Panel C) is based on a four-point scale, drawing on the four levels of education described in
the data section. All regressions include the same set of controls as the estimations summarized in Table 9. Robust
standard errors (allowing for clustering on the community level and/or heteroskedasticity of unknown form) are in
parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10-percent level, 5-percent level, and 1-percent
level, respectively. Standardized (beta) coefficients are in square brackets. a Column (5) provides the t-statistics
and p-values in curly brackets for the hypothesis that the coefficients of interest in the subsamples from columns
(1) and (4) are identical. Column (6) provides the t-statistics and p-values in curly brackets for the hypothesis
that the coefficients of interest in the subsamples from columns (2) and (3) are identical. All t-statistics are based
on fully interacted models using the respective pooled samples and report the t-statistic on the coefficient on the
interaction term between the share of immigrants and a binary indicator for the second sample. b In the case of
Panel D, columns (2) and (4) are compared.
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Table 11. The effect of the change in the share of immigrants on the change in the
availability of child-care facilities and commuting to school: IV estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(Percent) change in the outcome variable
Dependent variable: Proxy for low Hort : Kindergrippe:
quality of local Availability of a Availability of
schools: Share of after-school care a day nursery
out-commuting facility for children for children
Austrian students over 6 years under 3 years
∆01-91 ∆01-81 ∆11-01 ∆11-91 ∆11-01 ∆11-91
Percent change 0.021 −0.003 −0.030 −0.068∗ −0.038 −0.014
in share of immigrants (0.020) (0.009) (0.033) (0.037) (0.028) (0.028)
[0.059] [−0.008]
By skill group:
low skilled immigrants 0.011 0.015 −0.062∗∗ −0.050∗ −0.051∗∗ −0.048∗∗
(0.019) (0.015) (0.029) (0.029) (0.023) (0.024)
[0.029] [0.029]
high skilled immigrants 0.027 −0.043 0.026 0.026 −0.036 −0.070
(0.021) (0.034) (0.055) (0.054) (0.044) (0.055)
[0.110] [−0.069]
Number of observations 1,927 1,925 1,819 1,819 1,819 1,819
Mean of dependent variable 0.106 0.110 0.074 0.099 0.061 0.085
Mean of share of immigrants 0.621 3.939 0.303 0.305 0.303 0.305
low skilled 0.522 3.352 0.258 0.258 0.258 0.258
high skilled 0.824 4.613 0.833 0.840 0.833 0.840
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 28.339 26.450 35.478 35.141 35.728 35.342
low skilled 9.720 72.778 24.074 23.557 24.490 23.920
high skilled 16.135 50.972 10.921 11.166 11.603 11.770
This table summarizes the estimated effect of immigration on compositional amenities based on a series of weighted
2SLS estimations using Austrian community level data. The dependent variables are stated at the top of each column.
The dependent variable in column (1) is the change, from 1991 to 2001, in the fraction of school children that are
commuting more than 15 minutes for their school. For this variable, data are not available for 2011. Column (2) shows
results for the change from 1981 to 2001. In columns (3) and (4), the dependent variable is a variable that is equal to
1 if a community offers an after-school care club in the year 2011, but did not offer one in 2001; it is 0 if there was
no change; and it is -1 if the community offered an after-school care club in the year 2011, but offered one in 2001.
The dependent variables in the other columns are defined similarly. The endogenous variables — for which estimated
coefficients and standard errors from the 2nd stage are listed — are the percent changes in the share of immigrants in
community i between the two census dates referred to in the column header. This variable is instrumented by the
percent changes in the predicted share of immigrants in community i between the two dates. The predictions is based
on the spatial distribution of immigrants (from Ex-Yugoslavia, Turkey and other countries) across communities in the
year 1971 and the subsequent group-specific inflows relevant for the two years. All regressions include the same set of
controls as the estimations summarized in Table 9. Robust standard errors (allowing for clustering on the community
(and, in the case of pooled regressions) census year levels and/or heteroskedasticity of unknown form) are in parentheses.
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10-percent level, 5-percent level, and 1-percent level, respectively.
Where appropriate, standardized (beta) coefficients are in square brackets.
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Web Appendix
This Web Appendix (not for publication) provides additional material dis-
cussed in the paper ‘Immigration and Voting for the Far Right’ by Martin
Halla, Alexander F. Wagner, and Josef Zweimu¨ller, which is forthcoming in
the Journal of the European Economic Association.
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A.2
Supplementary Appendix B Additional tables
The following two Tables show estimation output with all controls (Table B.1) and summa-
rize robustness to inclusion of control variables (Table B.2). These results are commented
in the article.
B.1
Table B.1. Full estimation output for the fixed effects estimation of the effect of the
share of immigrants on the share of FPO¨ votes
(1) (2) (3)
Low High
All skilled skilled
immigrants immigrants immigrants
Share of immigrants 0.159∗∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗ −0.757∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.046) (0.111)
No. of inhabitants 0.034∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
No. of inhabitants2 −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age-sex-distributiona
Share of male natives between 5 and 9 −0.016 0.024 −0.037
(0.151) (0.151) (0.150)
Share of male natives between 10 and 14 −0.324∗∗∗ −0.299∗∗∗ −0.363∗∗∗
(0.114) (0.113) (0.115)
Share of male natives between 15 and 19 −0.804∗∗ −0.714∗∗ −0.593∗
(0.360) (0.354) (0.358)
Share of male natives between 20 and 25 −0.518 −0.388 −0.271
(0.339) (0.332) (0.337)
Share of male natives between 26 and 29 −0.810∗∗ −0.686∗ −0.445
(0.361) (0.354) (0.363)
Share of male natives between 30 and 39 −0.701∗∗ −0.586∗ −0.408
(0.345) (0.337) (0.345)
Share of male natives between 40 and 49 −0.491 −0.377 −0.088
(0.343) (0.336) (0.344)
Share of male natives between 50 and 59 −1.008∗∗∗ −0.914∗∗∗ −0.641∗
(0.344) (0.337) (0.345)
Share of male natives between 60 and 69 −0.869∗∗ −0.706∗ −0.553
(0.370) (0.363) (0.368)
Share of male natives between 70 and 00 −0.150 0.013 0.023
(0.380) (0.374) (0.374)
Share of female natives between 0 and 4 0.078 0.111 0.055
(0.151) (0.149) (0.150)
Share of female natives between 5 and 9 0.248 0.273∗ 0.213
(0.151) (0.150) (0.153)
Share of female natives between 10 and 14 −0.291∗∗ −0.256∗ −0.413∗∗∗
(0.139) (0.138) (0.140)
Share of female natives between 15 and 19 −0.577 −0.465 −0.405
(0.364) (0.358) (0.361)
Share of female natives between 20 and 25 −0.409 −0.243 −0.365
(0.362) (0.356) (0.358)
Share of female natives between 26 and 29 −0.525 −0.357 −0.361
(0.364) (0.356) (0.364)
Share of female natives between 30 and 39 −0.058 0.086 −0.110
(0.360) (0.352) (0.357)
Share of female natives between 40 and 49 0.067 0.212 0.083
(0.360) (0.352) (0.360)
Share of female natives between 50 and 59 −0.517 −0.384 −0.392
(0.338) (0.329) (0.339)
Share of female natives between 60 and 69 −0.766∗∗ −0.608∗ −0.520
(0.350) (0.339) (0.351)
Share of female natives between 70 and 00 −0.549 −0.456 −0.392
(0.343) (0.335) (0.341)
Continued on next page . . .
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Marital statusb
Share of married natives 0.087 0.080 −0.162∗∗
(0.070) (0.065) (0.073)
Share of widowed natives 0.251∗∗ 0.273∗∗ 0.067
(0.119) (0.115) (0.119)
Share of divorced natives 0.667∗∗∗ 0.638∗∗∗ 0.186
(0.140) (0.134) (0.152)
Labor market statusc
Share of unemployed natives −0.115 −0.195 −0.078
(0.132) (0.128) (0.133)
Share of retired natives 0.095 0.073 0.105
(0.100) (0.099) (0.101)
Share of native children below 15 −0.544∗ −0.471 −0.237
(0.321) (0.314) (0.319)
Share of native pupils/students 0.487∗∗∗ 0.513∗∗∗ 0.494∗∗∗
(0.133) (0.131) (0.135)
Share of other natives 0.146∗∗ 0.125∗ 0.201∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.064) (0.069)
Industrial structured
Agriculture and forestry −0.028∗∗ −0.026∗∗ −0.024∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Fishery −0.342 −0.363 −0.292
(0.407) (0.410) (0.422)
Coal mining, oil and gas −0.026 −0.023 −0.025
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Ore mining −0.045∗∗ −0.044∗∗ −0.040∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.021)
Foodstuffs, drinks, and tobacco −0.038∗∗ −0.036∗∗ −0.035∗∗
(0.016) (0.015) (0.016)
Textiles and clothing −0.032∗∗ −0.032∗∗ −0.019
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
Leather and shoes 0.055 0.058 0.063
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
Wood processing −0.042∗∗∗ −0.040∗∗∗ −0.033∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Paper conversation; printing −0.049∗∗∗ −0.046∗∗∗ −0.046∗∗
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Coking plants; petroleum processing −0.064 −0.065 −0.059
(0.052) (0.050) (0.047)
Chemical products −0.057∗∗ −0.055∗∗ −0.053∗∗
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Rubber and plastics −0.051∗∗ −0.056∗∗ −0.038∗∗
(0.021) (0.022) (0.019)
Glass, stone, and earth working −0.037∗∗ −0.035∗∗ −0.024
(0.015) (0.014) (0.015)
Metal production −0.049∗∗∗ −0.047∗∗∗ −0.046∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
Engineering −0.034∗∗ −0.031∗∗ −0.026∗
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
Production of business machines, data processing −0.071∗∗ −0.066∗∗ −0.063∗∗
Continued on next page . . .
B.3
. . . continued from previous page.
(0.029) (0.028) (0.029)
Vehicle manufacturing −0.039∗ −0.037∗∗ −0.026
(0.020) (0.019) (0.019)
Production of furniture, musical instruments, sports tools −0.033∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗ −0.029∗∗
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
Energy and water supply 0.045 0.049 0.041
(0.041) (0.041) (0.043)
Construction −0.010 −0.010 −0.006
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Trade −0.040∗∗∗ −0.035∗∗∗ −0.040∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
Hotels and restaurants −0.015 −0.015 −0.007
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
Transport and communication −0.003 −0.001 0.002
(0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
Loans and insurance industry −0.010 −0.013 0.002
(0.029) (0.028) (0.028)
Real estate; entpreneurial services −0.050∗∗∗ −0.047∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
Education 0.079 0.081 0.069
(0.073) (0.073) (0.074)
Health and social services −0.028 −0.027 −0.021
(0.021) (0.020) (0.020)
Other public or personal services −0.052∗∗∗ −0.047∗∗∗ −0.045∗∗
(0.018) (0.017) (0.019)
Private housholds 0.009 0.012 0.012
(0.028) (0.029) (0.027)
Extraterritorial organizations −1.479∗ −1.278∗ −1.172
(0.770) (0.711) (0.735)
Constant 0.546 0.424 0.503
(0.334) (0.329) (0.331)
Election yearse yes yes yes
No. of obs. 14,598 14,598 14,598
Mean of dep var 0.156 0.156 0.156
Sd of dep var 0.094 0.094 0.094
Mean of immigrants 0.073 0.057 0.014
Sd of immigrants 0.063 0.048 0.017
The estimations presented provide the full estimation output for estimations summarized in Table 4. Number of inhab-
itants is measured in 10.000. a Base group: Share of males between 0 and 5. b Base group: Share of singles natives.
c Base group: Share of employed natives. d Base group: Unknown. e Binary indicators for the election years 1983, 1990,
1994, 1999, 2002. and 2013. Base group: 1979.
B.4
Table B.2. Robustness to less/further controls: FE- and IV-estimations
(1) (2) (3)
Definition of treatment variable
Low High
All skilled skilled
Method of estimation immigrants immigrants immigrants
FE-estimation:
Specification: Community and year fixed-effects 0.033 0.148∗∗ -0.512∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.072) (0.124)
[0.022] [0.076] [-0.090]
Specification: + Demographic controls 0.163∗∗∗ 0.301∗∗∗ -0.759∗∗∗
(0.043) (0.052) (0.110)
[0.110] [0.155] [-0.134]
Specification: + Industrial structure 0.160∗∗∗ 0.289∗∗∗ -0.722∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.047) (0.109)
[0.108] [0.149] [-0.128]
Specification: + Labor market controls 0.159∗∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗ -0.757∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.046) (0.111)
[0.107] [0.154] [-0.134]
Specification: + Educational attainment 0.134∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ -0.232∗∗
(0.032) (0.037) (0.110)
[0.090] [0.107] [-0.041]
Continued on next page . . .
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IV-estimation:
Specification: Only year fixed effects 0.109∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ -0.135∗∗
(0.021) (0.022) (0.062)
[0.226] [0.205] [-0.174]
KP rk Wald F 42.079 99.758 32.630
Specification: + Historical controls 0.097∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗ -0.054
(0.021) (0.022) (0.039)
[0.201] [0.174] [-0.069]
KP rk Wald F 40.815 96.871 58.637
Specification: + State fixed effects 0.078∗∗∗ 0.086∗∗∗ -0.089∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.021) (0.032)
[0.161] [0.141] [-0.115]
KP rk Wald F 38.400 91.110 73.155
Specification: + Demographic controls 0.050∗∗ 0.042∗∗ -0.039
(0.019) (0.020) (0.026)
[0.103] [0.069] [-0.050]
KP rk Wald F 34.601 82.292 73.373
Specification: + Industrial structure 0.048∗∗ 0.040∗∗ -0.044
(0.019) (0.020) (0.027)
[0.100] [0.066] [-0.057]
KP rk Wald F 34.957 83.731 71.691
Specification: + Labor market controls 0.048∗∗ 0.041∗∗ -0.025
(0.019) (0.020) (0.027)
[0.100] [0.067] [-0.033]
KP rk Wald F 34.820 83.259 70.774
Specification: + Educational attainment 0.048∗∗ 0.041∗∗ -0.029
(0.019) (0.020) (0.027)
[0.099] [0.067] [-0.037]
KP rk Wald F 35.170 83.979 70.062
The estimations presented in this table should be compared to those presented in Table 4
and Table 9 in the paper. The specification termed ‘Community and year fixed effects’ con-
trols only for community and election year fixed effects. The specification termed ‘Only
year fixed effects’ controls only for election year fixed effects. The specification termed
‘Historical controls’ includes in addition the share of immigrants in 1971 and the unem-
ployment rate in 1961. The specification termed ‘+ State fixed effects’ controls in addition
for state fixed effects. The specification termed ‘+ Demographic controls’ includes in ad-
dition the community’s number of inhabitants, the number of inhabitants squared, the
natives’ age-sex-distribution (22 groups) and the natives’ distribution of marital status
(shares of inhabitants who are single, married, divorced, and widowed). The specification
termed ‘+ Industrial structure‘ controls in addition for the relative size of 32 sectors; an
din the case of the IV-estimations further for the industry structure in 1973 (i.e., time
constant covariates). The specification termed ‘+ Labor market controls’ includes in ad-
dition for the natives’ distribution of labor market status (share of inhabitants who are
employed, unemployed, retirees, children below 15, student, and others). This specification
is equivalent to our baseline specification used in the paper. The specification termed ‘+
Educational attainment’ controls in addition for the natives’ educational attainment (re-
ferring to individuals 15 years of age or older), which is captured by the share with low
skills (no degree), medium skills (apprenticeship or lower secondary school) and high sills
(higher secondary school or with an academic degree).
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